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Introduction
Quantum information certainly is one of the most promising interdisciplinary
elds that take advantage of quantum mechanics.
By combining the principles of this theory with state of the art technology, it man-
ages to break communication and information problems that cannot be solved with
classical theories, and it achieves that in ultimately thrilling and appealing ways.
One of the elds where this theory turned out to be groundbreaking is cryptog-
raphy, a subject that directly or indirectly interests specialists and non-specialists
alike. In this research area, the photon is certainly the favorite quantum object to
work with. We will see how quantum properties of light can make communication
more secure - or may we say unconditionally secure - and eective. In particular,
the cryptographic task of key distribution between two users and its generalization
to many parties, called secret sharing, have been heavily studied after Bennett and
Brassard proposed a protocol for secure key distribution employing single photon
polarization in 1984 [1].
In the following years, many theoretical proposals and experimental realizations
vastly stimulated the scientic community interest in this subjects.
Nowadays, quantum key distribution (QKD) with good rates over 200 kilometers of
optical ber has been achieved [2], and protocols for secure quantum secret sharing
(QSS) with many parties over dozens of kilometers of bers have been successfully
carried out [3]. The general goal is to implement these schemes in the already ex-
tensively available ber telecommunication network, in order to have a smoother
transition from classical to quantum communication.
In the past decade, QKD systems have become commercially available, and success-
ful secure quantum communication over real ber telecommunication networks have
been attained around the world.
All these experiments share a common feature: they use two dimensional quan-
tum systems (called qubits) as information carriers. However, as higher dimensional-
ity means denser coding1 and looser security requirements [4], several research groups
1To understand this, compare a big number written in base ten with the same number in binary
system. Which one is longer?
v
have shown their interest in testing protocols in higher dimension, and consequently
QKD protocols for more than two dimensions have been successfully implemented
in the lab.
With regard to QSS, proposals with three dimensional systems - called qutrits in
analogy with qubits - have obtained good experimental results [5]. However, they
all suer from the consequences of being based on entanglement, specically they
are not scalable with respect to the number of parties participating in the secret
sharing, mainly because of two reasons; the rst one is somehow technological, that
is, entangled states with many particles are still hard to prepare in the lab. The
second reason is related to detection eciency and is more intrinsic: the proposed
protocols require single photons detections from every user in an experiment run,
thus detection eciency decreases exponentially with the number of users.
Our work, realized at the KIKO group labs in Stockholm2, consisted in realizing
a proof-of-principle experiment that implemented a dierent and innovative protocol
for qutrits QSS, proposed in [6], in a ber interferometric setup. The main dierence
between this new scheme and the ones we have just mentioned is that this does
not require entanglement, being instead based on one single photon per run, with
information encoded in its phase. Our conguration is highly scalable because it
needs only three detectors, therefore its detection eciency is independent from the
number of parties. This is, of course, of paramount importance in a secret sharing
protocol.
After a brief recap of some classical features of cryptography and optics in the
rst chapter, we will move into the fascinating quantum world.
First of all, the basic ingredients that any work related to quantum cryptography
needs will be presented in chapter 2, then we will discuss a bit more in detail about
quantum cryptography in chapter 3, and in particular about QKD and QSS, nally
presenting the protocol we implemented in a general and formal way at the end of
the same chapter.
The last part, i.e. chapter 4, regards our experimental work. Results and com-
ments will follow a description of the setup we built and a more specic explanation
of the protocol.
2http://kiko.fysik.su.se/
Chapter 1
Classical Foundations
1.1 Cryptography
Every piece of information we share has a target, and whenever this information
has any value we would like it to be acknowledged only by the designated receiver.
In an ideal world writing TOP SECRET on top of the message would suce but,
unfortunately, that is usually not the case. This is why cryptography was invented
thousands of years ago. The rst form of cryptography simply consisted in writ-
ing down the secret message anywhere, since literacy was practically non-existent.
Ancient Greeks used bizarre methods as tattooing the message on a slave's shaved
head and hide it under the grown hair [7], but also started adopting proper cryp-
tographic protocols, as transposition and substitution cyphers. Even though these
methods are still employed nowadays, mainly by rst grade children, they are known
to be easily breakable by means of frequency analysis. Many other protocols were
invented during the Renaissance thanks to the general improvement of education
standards and advances in science, however modern cryptographic methods can be
easily divided in two groups: symmetric-key and asymmetric-key cyphers. The for-
mer group exploits the same key for encrypting and decrypting, while the latter
needs two keys, usually a public one for encrypting and a private one for decrypting.
Let's see some examples.
1.1.1 One-time Pad - A Symmetric-key cypher
The One-time pad method, invented in 1882 by Frank Miller, is to this day the
only (classical) method proved to be completely secure [8]. The encryption and
decryption of any message is based on the bitwise exclusive OR (XOR) operation
and the key should be at least as long as the message itself. We can see a practical
example in Table 1.1. Provided that the key is random, never reused and secret,
1
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Message Y E S
Plain text ASCII 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Secret digital key 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Encrypted text ASCII 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Secret digital key 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Deciphered text ASCII 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Message Y E S
Table 1.1: Example of one-time pad. The message (written in ASCII code) is en-
crypted by XOR operation with the secret key. The key, once transmitted to the
receiver, can be applied again to obtain the original message.
the cypher is totally unbreakable. The only information an adversary can gain
from the key is the maximum length of the message. Unfortunately, the one-time
pad method has some severe disadvantages: for it to be secure, the key must be
genuinely random, a requirement not easily satised; but most of all, every time we
send a message we need to generate a new (one-time) key at least as long as the
message that has to be securely and wholly transmitted to the receiver. These are
the reasons why this cryptographic method is usually discarded in favor of less - or
dierently - secure protocols. Let's have a look at the most famous one.
1.1.2 The RSA protocol - Computationally secure cryptog-
raphy
With the blazing fast development of technology and telecommunications in the
twentieth century, a fundamental problem concerning security arose: the key distri-
bution part of any cyphering process for symmetric-key protocols is risky and very
demanding. Die and Hellman managed to solve this problem in 1976, when they
published the rst public-key method (known as the Die-Hellman key exchange
[9]) that successfully established a secret key over an authenticated public chan-
nel without prior secret-key sharing. One year later Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and
Leonard Adleman invented the famous RSA algorithm [10], which is still used today
for both secret sharing and digital signature. The protocol has been upgraded many
times since its rst release to overcome potential weak spots, but we can understand
the way it works just by looking at the original algorithm. Before starting, we should
introduce Alice and Bob, two characters (not necessarily human) usually living at
least one room apart and with plenty of secret stu going on between them. They
are the protagonists of every cryptographic protocol, either classical or quantum,
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and they often have to deal with their technologically cutting edge and innitely
rich arch-enemy, Eve the eavesdropper, trying to work out their secrets 24/7. Now,
back to the RSA protocol, let's pretend that Alice needs to send a secret encrypted
message to Bob. This is how they could do it:
1) Bob: keys generation
 Chooses two random distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit-length
and calculates n = p  q. The length of n is the key-length
 Computes the totient (n) = (p  1)(q   1)
 Picks an integer 1 < e < (n) such that e is coprime with (n)
 Announces n and e on a public channel. (n; e) is the public key
 Calculates the private key exponent d by solving d  e = 1 mod (n). (n; d)
is the private key.
2) Alice: message encryption
 Converts the message M to an integer 0 < m < n using a padding protocol
 Encrypts the message by calculating the cypher-text c = me mod n
 Sends the cypher-text c over a public channel
3) Bob: message decryption
 Using the private key (n; d), decrypts the message c calculating m = cd
mod n
 Recovers the plain-text message M applying the same padding protocol
used by Bob.
We see that any eavesdropper trying to calculate d starting from the public
key (n; e) will have to factorize n to nd p and q. This is called the factorization
problem and with the currently available algorithms it's solvable in exponential time.
This means that breaking the RSA encryption takes a time which is exponential to
the bit-length of n. Keys up to 768 bits have been broken [11], and modern RSA
protocols use 1024 to 2048 bits keys. So this protocol is not completely secure. It
is only computationally secure, in the sense that no available computational power
could break it in any reasonable time. However, we cannot be sure that a new
algorithm capable of solving the factorization problem in polynomial time has not
been or will never be invented. Actually, Peter Shor has proved in 1994 [12] that a
quantum computer could, using Shor's quantum algorithm, solve the factorization
problem in polynomial time, therefore breaking RSA security. The world clearly
needs a new kind of cryptography.
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1.2 Optics
This work is based on quantum mechanics applied to optics. However, most of
the experimental characterization of the various components used has been done
in classical regime. The reason is that working in classical conditions is much eas-
ier than quantum (for example you can use oscilloscopes instead of the extremely
delicate single photon detectors). This is possible because, as we will see later on,
many optical objects and physical quantities behave in a very similar way in the
two regimes. For example, whenever we consider interference we are interested in
intensities, which are proportional to squared eld amplitudes. Very similarly in
the quantum formulation we would like to predict the number of photons (i.e. the
probability density functions), which in turn is proportional to the squared modulus
of the wave function. Therefore we give now a brief recap of classical optics, before
moving on into the quantum world.
1.2.1 Electromagnetic waves
We all know that light is a wave, and of course we have - at least - heard
about Maxwell's equations. Let's see how the rst statement is derived from those
legendary equations. If we have electric eld E, magnetic eld B, electric charge
density  end electric current density j, then the equations describing the elds
evolution are
r  E = 
0
(1.1a)
r B = 0 (1.1b)
r E =  @B
@t
(1.1c)
rB = 0j  1
c2
@E
@t
: (1.1d)
In vacuum, with no electric charge or current, the solutions to Maxwell equations
are the electromagnetic waves. In fact, if we take the curl of eqs. (1.1c) and (1.1d)
and use the vector identity
r (r F) =r(r  F) r2F (1.2)
keeping in mind eqs. (1.1a) and (1.1b), we get
r2   1
c2
@2
@t2

E = 0 (1.3)
r2   1
c2
@2
@t2

B = 0 (1.4)
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These are equations describing transverse waves propagating with velocity c and
with E ? B. The explicit solutions are
E = E0e
i(kr !t+) (1.5)
B = B0e
i(kr !t+) (1.6)
where jE0j and jB0j are the waves amplitudes, k is the wave vector, ! the pulsation
frequency and  the optical phase. We should also remember that c = !=k. The
previous calculations were done for EM waves traveling in vacuum, but the analysis
is the same - short of some constants - for any dielectric medium. The main dier-
ence, which aected our work, is that the wave velocity in a material with relative
permittivity r becomes
v =
cp
r
=
c
n
(1.7)
Another important property of EM waves is polarization. This is dened as the
direction of the electric eld and, considering that E and B lie on the plane perpen-
dicular to k, it can be of three dierent types:
 linear polarization: the direction of E is constant
 circular polarization: E rotates along a circle. This situation can be seen as
two orthogonal linearly polarized waves with the same amplitude and 
2
phase
dierence
 elliptical polarization: this is the most general case, and we can depict it as
two orthogonal linearly polarized waves with a phase dierence that is neither
0 nor 
2
.
It's usually extremely important to control the polarization when working on secure
communication with single photons. In fact, in order to have high interference
visibility, the light pulses should have equal amplitude and polarization. While
amplitudes - or intensities - are easy enough to control, polarization is trickier.
In fact, light pulses propagating in free space are not subjected to polarization
changes, but there are other transparent materials that have dierent refractive
indexes depending on the polarization of the traveling wave. This special property of
such crystals is called birefringence. As we will see later on, standard communication
bers are strongly birefringent, and this has been one of the most delicate aspects
of this work.
1.2.2 Interference
The main physical phenomenon behind the secret sharing achieved in this work
is interference, so it is important to have a good understanding of the subject. The
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principle of superposition states that whenever two light waves are located on the
same spacial region, their amplitudes sum point by point. This is called interference,
and we should mention that it happens only if the two waves have similar proper-
ties, namely polarization and frequency. Interference is called constructive when the
phase dierence between the two waves is an even multiple of , while odd multiples
will give destructive interference.
Many types of interferometers have been invented, depending on aim and applica-
tion; We can see an example of a simple Mach-Zehnder interferometer on bers in
Fig. 1.1: a light pulse entering the interferometer from port A gets splitted by the
ber coupler (FC). The two halves go through arms 1 and 2 - or paths L1 and L2 -
and recombine at the output C thanks to a second ber coupler. We can do some
calculations considering a simple case where only 50 : 50 couplers are used, with nei-
ther attenuation nor birefringence. To make the example slightly more interesting
(and suitable to this thesis) let's consider an extra phase  added to the pulse going
through arm 1, achieved by using, for example, a commercial phase modulator. We
should consider only the electrical eld, as we know from Maxwell's equations that
jEj  cjBj, so I  jEj2. The incoming light wave is then of the form of eq. (1.5).
After the second coupler the two halves recombine and at point C we have
E(C; t) =
E0
2
ei(kL1 !t+) +
E0
2
ei(kL2 !t)
=
E0
2
ei(kL1 !t+)
 
1 + ei[k(L2 L1) ]

(1.8)
We can nd the light intensity at the output C, which is what we actually measure,
by taking the squared average of eq. (1.8)
I(C) =
jE0j2
2
(1 + cos(kL  )) (1.9)
Figure 1.1: A simple Mach-Zehnder interferometer on bers with input port A, a
ber coupler that splits the incoming light into two arms of length L1 and L2, one
of which includes a  phase shift, another coupler that recombines the paths together
into output port C.
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It's now clear that we have maxima whenever the cosine argument is an even multiple
of , that is
L

  
2
= m; m 2 Z (1.10)
while minima are related to odd multiples of .
1.2.3 Multiport Devices
In the last paragraph we have seen a simple example of a two-arms interferometer.
This work, however, is based on a three-arms interferometer; in order to build such
a setup we need something slightly more complicated than a plain coupler. Any
optical device with N inputs and N outputs is called a multiport device, and can
be seen as a black box related to a transfer matrix which describes how any input
state (e.g. an electrical eld) is transformed into an output state. Once again we
will consider only the case with neither attenuation nor birefringence. The latter
approximation is allowed because we used only polarization maintaining bers in
the three interferometer arms with linearly polarized light (and polarization aligned
to the ber slow axis). Any birefringent optical element was placed exclusively
in common paths, so that all interfering pulses would undergo the same changes,
thus resulting in no relative eect. This will be much clearer later on once we
present the optical setup in detail. The lossless approximation, however, is never
strictly correct in practice. One of the 3x3 beam splitters (also called tritters)
we used, for example, has coupling ratios (from input 1 to the outputs) of 36% :
27% : 36%, meaning that some light is lost inside the tritter. Anyway, as we are
not interested in absolute intensities, but only in relative ones, we can consider this
approximation legitimate as long as the coupling ratios for the dierent input-output
congurations are approximately equal. In the lossless case the device is called ideal
multiport splitter. Considering then an ideal splitter, energy conservation guarantees
the unitarity of the transfer matrix, and if we consider tritters with equal coupling
ratios for any input-output combination, we get the condition that each matrix
entry should have the same absolute value. These conditions dramatically reduce
the possible dierent matrices. We present here the 3x3 symmetric tritter case,
as this is what we actually employed in the experiment. A candidate frequently
adopted in literature [13][14] is the matrix
T =
1p
3
0B@1 1 11 e i 23 ei 23
1 ei
2
3 e i
2
3
1CA (1.11)
We can now use this matrix to predict the output intensities of a balanced (L1 =
L2 = L3 in Fig. 1.2) three-arms Mach-Zehnder interferometer similar to the one in
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Figure 1.2: Mach-Zehnder three-arms ber interferometer consisting of two 3x3 trit-
ters and two phase modulators. Commercially available tritters introduce by default
a 23 relative phase between any two of the three inputs (as we can see from Eq. (1.11)).
Fig. 1.2.
The full matrix of the whole tritter-phase modulators-tritter system is of course
the matrix product of the three dierent elements, that is
TST =
1p
3
0B@1 1 11 e i 23 ei 23
1 ei
2
3 e i
2
3
1CA
0B@1 0 00 ei2 0
0 0 ei3
1CA 1p
3
0B@1 1 11 e i 23 ei 23
1 ei
2
3 e i
2
3
1CA (1.12)
where the matrix S represents phase modulators in arms 2 and 3 that carry out
phase shifts of respectively 2 and 3 angles. If we name the incoming electric eld
Ein  (Ein1 ; 0; 0)1 and the outgoing electric eld Eout  (Eout1 ; Eout2 ; Eout3 ), with the
subscript index representing the input/output port as in Fig. 1.2, we can compute
the output amplitudes simply by
Eout = (TST )Ein (1.13)
As always we are interested in intensities, i.e. the squared modulus of electric elds,
which can be found after some calculations to be
I1 =
(Ein1 )
2
9
f3 + 2 [cos2 + cos3 + cos(2   3)]g (1.14a)
I2 =
(Ein1 )
2
9

3 + 2

cos

2   2
3

+ cos

3 +
2
3

+ cos

2   3 + 2
3

(1.14b)
I3 =
(Ein1 )
2
9

3 + 2

cos

2 +
2
3

+ cos

3   2
3

+ cos

2   3   2
3

(1.14c)
We can notice from these equations that (relative) output intensities depend only
on phase dierences between distinct paths. Most importantly, whenever we have a
1In our experiment, as happens in most of the same type, we are using only one input port of
the tritter. In this example we are connecting the laser source to input 1.
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maximum in one output (e.g. in port 1 for (2; 3) = (0; 0)), the other two yield no
light at all. We will see how this property translates into the quantum language of
operators and probabilities, and how crucial it is for secret sharing.
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Chapter 2
The Quantum World
2.1 The Basics
At the very beginning of the twentieth century Max Planck and Albert Einstein
explained black-body radiation and the photoelectric eect with a very bold hy-
pothesis: light can behave as if it was made of particles - later called photons - with
discrete energy levels and momenta. Before the end of the twenties, quantum me-
chanics, or at least all its basic principles, had been pretty much laid out. However,
no one could foresee how remarkably accurate its predictions were going to turn out
in future experiments. One century later we are still looking for new ways to ex-
ploit the amazing consequences of this counterintuitive - often even illogical - theory.
Quantum communication is one of the most straightforward yet potentially revolu-
tionary application taking advantage of the quantum properties of reality, namely
the wave-particle duality, the superposition principle and the no-cloning theorem.
We will have a look at these special features of the theory in the next paragraphs.
2.1.1 Wave-Particle Duality
Black-body radiation and the photoelectric eect can both be explained assuming
that light consists of particles - photons - with quantized energy, E = h per photon
of frequency . h is of course the Planck constant, introduced in 1901 by Max
Planck appositely to solve the black-body emission spectrum problem. But of course
we know from our everyday experience that light also has wavelike properties, as
diraction and interference. The single most astonishing experiment showing this
dual nature is the well-known double slit experiment, where single, isolated photons
show interference patterns only if we are not aware of the paths they took, otherwise
they simply behave as classical particles. Experiments showing interference fringes
have been run not only with photons, but also with electrons, atoms and even much
11
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bigger molecules exceeding 10000 amu [15]. In conclusion, not only light but matter
too is inherently dual in nature, and in order to fully understand quantum mechanics
and grasp the logic governing it we denitely need to abandon the classical notions
of particles and waves, moving instead towards the idea of a quantum particle.
This can be done introducing the quantum state - or wave function -  .
2.1.2 The Quantum State j	i1
In any physical theory we characterize a system by its state and experimentally
measurable quantities called observables. In the quantum mechanics formalism
we identify a generic (pure) state by a vector in a Hilbert space, whose properties
depend on the system it is linked to. We also refer to vectors in Hilbert spaces
as wave functions, as these spaces are usually made up of complex functions. For
example, the Hilbert space associated to position and momentum states of a single
particle is the space of square-integrable (wave) functions L2. While states are linked
to wave functions, observables are represented by self-adjoint linear operators acting
on the state space. The possible states of a system (after a measurement) are the
eigenstates of these operators, and the eigenvalues related to these eigenstates
are the possible values of the observable associated with an operator.
Before a measurement, a system can be in a state j	i which is a linear combi-
nation of pure states jii, each with its own statistical weight factor ci. We write
this generic state as
j	i =
X
i
cijii : (2.1)
In the standard interpretation (a.k.a. Copenhagen interpretation) of quantum
mechanics, whenever we measure an observable on a state the system collapses
on an eigenstate of the measured observable and the measurement outcome is the
eigenvalue related to that eigenstate.
Wave functions also give us the so called transition probabilities, which represent
the probability for a system to collapse from a state j	ii to a state j	ji after a
measurement. We can get these probabilities by calculating the squared absolute
value of the inner product (dening the considered Hilbert space) between the two
states
P (j	ii ! j	ji) = kh	ij	jik2 (2.2)
It is clear that if we write the initial state j	i as in Eq. (2.1) including all possible
nal states in the sum, the transition probability to any state jii will simply be
khij	ik2 = jcij2 (2.3)
1We are going to use the bra-ket notation throughout the whole thesis, taking for granted the
reader's knowledge about it.
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The probabilistic nature of quantummechanics comes then from the measurement
process. With regards to position measurements, we can think of quantum particles
as waves that interact with each other by means of interference and superposition as
long as we do not measure their location, at which point they immediately collapse
in a position operator eigenstate (i.e. a precise location) and assume particle-like
properties.
On a slightly more technical level, we can explain quantum interference by in-
troducing the superposition principle.
2.1.3 Superposition Principle
The link between mathematical foundations - that give us Hilbert spaces and
wave functions - and physics is the Schrödinger equation. Its most general form
for a single non-relativistic particle is
  ~
2
2m
r2 + V (r; t)

	(r; t) = i~
@
@t
	(r; t) (2.4)
where as usual m is the particle mass, V (r; t) the potential energy and 	(r; t) the
particle wave function. Eq. (2.4) is a linear partial dierential equation. In partic-
ular, its linearity implies that many (often in innite number) wave functions 	(r; t)
are solutions to the equation. The physical meaning of this statement is explained
by the superposition principle: a quantum system exists in all its possible states
(i.e. wave functions that solve its Schrödinger equation) simultaneously, but as soon
as a measurement is performed on the system, it collapses in one of the possible
eigenstates of the measured observable. It is crucial to understand that this uncer-
tainty deriving from superposition is not something caused by our limited knowledge
of the system that just goes away as soon as we perform a measurement. A quantum
system before a measurement actually is in a superposition of dierent states. This
is the reason why we can see interference patterns in the double slit experiment - or
in this work - even when we are working with a single photon. Regarding Fig. 1.2,
for example, due to a superposition of the states placing our photon in each of the
three arms, we actually measure interference-like intensities in the three outputs,
despite the photon being only one.
2.1.4 No-Cloning Theorem
The no-cloning theorem, rst proved by Wootters and Zurek in 1982 [16], is the
ultimate argument that makes quantum communication secure. There are dierent
ways to prove it; we are going to give a simple demonstration for pure states in
the following lines, but proofs exist for mixed states as well. Suppose we have two
14 The Quantum World
quantum systems, A and B, with the same state space. System A is initially in the
state j	iA, pure but unknown to us, while system B is in the pure generic state
j0iB. The whole point in copying is to have both systems in the state j	i in the end.
Slighty more precisely, we have a composite system initially in the state j	iA
j0iB,
and we want some unitary cloning operator to transform this state to j	iA 
 j	iB.
Suppose this operator exists, then it must be able to clone not only the initial
state j	iA, but also any other dierent initial state, for example jiA. In this case
we have
U (j	iA 
 j0iB) = j	iA 
 j	iB
U (jiA 
 j0iB) = jiA 
 jiB
(2.5)
If we take the inner product of eqs. (2.5), we end up we the very restricting condition
h	ji = (h	ji)2 (2.6)
This is satised either if j	i and ji are orthonormal or if j	i = ji.
We have just proved that no unitary operator can clone any pure state. From the
quantum communication security point of view, this means that if the exchanged
information is encoded in non-orthogonal states (i.e. with dierent bases), an eaves-
dropper will not be able to clone a single photon state without knowing a priori the
basis previously used for encoding.
Despite the no-cloning theorem, you can of course still make imperfect copies of
any unknown state. Actually, it turns out [17] that the optimal universal cloning
machine could reach, for a two-dimensional system, the surprising delity of
q
5
6
.
2.2 Quantum Optics
In the previous chapters we have briey discussed some aspects of classical optics
and quantum mechanics. This section is the place where these two elements come
together and create the extremely fascinating subject that is quantum optics.
How does classical optics become quantum? Not surprisingly, what we need is an
analogy and a quantization method. We have seen in Sec. 1.2.1 that the EM eld
(which we will mostly be calling light as per professional bias) is an oscillatory
phenomenon. The analogy is then of course between light and the harmonic oscilla-
tor. If we then quantize EM eld oscillations, what we get is the amazing quantum
optics!
We will start this section by explaining the basic ideas behind light quantization,
and after showing the analogy with an harmonic oscillator, we will have a look at
some interesting states of light that enhance its quantum nature.
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2.2.1 EM Field: Analogy and Quantization
In Sec. 1.2.1 we mentioned Eqs. (1.5, 1.6) as possible solutions for Maxwell
equations in vacuum. If we now suppose to conne the radiation eld in a one-
dimensional cavity along the z-axis limited by conductive walls at z = 0 and z = L,
the elds must vanish at the boundaries. We further assume that the cavity is empty
and that the electric eld is polarized along the x-axis.
Single-mode elds satisfying these boundary conditions are [18]
Ex(z; t) =
s
2!2
0V
q(t) sin(kz)
By(z; t) =
s
2!2
0V
00
k

_q(t) cos(kz)
(2.7)
where ! is the mode frequency and k its wave number, q(t) and _q(t) = p(t) include
time dependences of the solutions and have the dimension of length and velocity
respectively. We will see that these quantities are the canonical position and mo-
mentum for a unit mass particle.
The Hamiltonian of this single-mode EM eld is found by integrating the energy
density over the whole cavity volume, that is
H =
1
2
Z
dV

0E
2
x(z; t) +
1
0
B2y(z; t)

: (2.8)
Substituting Eqs. (2.7) into Eq. (2.8) we can easily nd
H =
1
2
 
p2 + !2q2

(2.9)
which is clearly equivalent to a harmonic oscillator of unit mass.
We now enter the quantum formalism by substituting the canonical position and
momentum variables with their corresponding quantum operators
q ! q^
p! p^ =  i~ @
@t
H ! H^
(2.10)
with the usual commutation relation
[q^; p^] = i~ : (2.11)
At this point the two ladder operators are traditionally introduced. They are the
annihilation operator a^, and its adjoint a^y, called the creation operator, dened as
a^ =
1p
2~!
(!q^ + ip^)
a^y =
1p
2~!
(!q^   ip^) :
(2.12)
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From Eqs. (2.11, 2.12) their commutation relation turns out to be
a^; a^y

= 1 : (2.13)
Substituting Eqs. (2.12) into the operator version of Eq. (2.8), we can rewrite the
Hamiltonian operator in terms of a^ and a^y as
H^ = ~!

a^ya^+
1
2

: (2.14)
With the commutators h
H^; a^y
i
= ~!a^yh
H^; a^
i
=  ~!a^s
(2.15)
and remembering the Schrödinger equation
H^	n = En	n (2.16)
we can nd out how the ladder operators act on the eigenfunctions of H^. With some
straightforward calculations we get
H^a^	n = (En   ~!)a^	n (2.17a)
H^a^y	n = (En + ~!)a^y	n : (2.17b)
Eqs. (2.17) show that the harmonic oscillator energy spectrum is discreet and its
eigenenergies are equally spaced by ~! steps. Furthermore, the creation operator
a^y raises the energy by ~! while the annihilation operator a^ lowers it by the same
amount.
Reassuming, the energy spectrum is
En =

n+
1
2

~! ; n 2 N (2.18)
We will see in the next paragraph how we can interpret the ladder operators and
the quantum number n in the EM eld case.
2.2.2 Photon Number State
Whenever we are considering light, the quanta of energy our system contains (n
in Eq. (2.18)) are called photons. We understand now why a^ and a^y are named
annihilation and creation operators: if we act on a state j	ni with a^, the system
will lose an amount of energy equal to ~!, that is, the annihilation operator will
remove a photon from the system. Of course the opposite happens with regards to
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a^y. We can therefore write the wave functions solving the Schrödinger equation for
the harmonic oscillator and the Schrödinger equation itself in the so-called number
state representation:
j	ni  jni
H^jni = ~!

n+
1
2

jni :
(2.19)
Considering Eqs. (2.17) and after normalization, we can redene ladder operators
as
a^jni = pnjn  1i
a^yjni = pn+ 1jn+ 1i
(2.20)
which imply
jni = 1p
n!
 
a^y
n j0i (2.21)
where j0i is the ground (or vacuum) state. Eq. (2.21) also suggests that we may
intuitively interpret the state jni as a vacuum state where n photons have been
created.
Finally, we should notice that if we act on the state jni with the operator a^ya^, we
get
a^ya^jni = pna^yjn  1i = njni : (2.22)
a^ya^ is indeed called number operator. Number states are eigenstates of the number
operator n^ as we can see from Eq. (2.22).
We will understand later how important this operator actually is for secure quantum
communication. Nevertheless, number states are not a good description of physical
eld states generated, for example, by a laser. It is actually possible to show [18]
that number and phase are complementary observables, so that number states have
uniform (i.e. random) phase distribution, which is certainly not the case for coherent
light coming from a laser source.
It is suitable then to introduce a dierent class of states, conveniently called coherent
states, which better describes real coherent light sources.
2.2.3 Coherent States
We have noticed in the previous section that number states contain a denite
number of photons and are thus characterized by completely random phases. On
the contrary, coherent states do not have a xed number of photons nor a precise
phase. Actually, the product of uncertainties in amplitude and phase for coherent
states is the minimum allowed by the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle [19].
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There are dierent ways of introducing coherent states; here we are going to do it
by taking advantage of their most fundamental dierence from number states, that
is, they are eigenstates of the annihilation operator. Thus, they must satisfy the
relation
a^ji = ji (2.23)
where  is a complex number as a^ is not Hermitian.
Thanks to number states completeness we may expand any state ji as
ji =
1X
n=0
cnjni ; (2.24)
acting with a^ on each term we get
1X
n=0
cn
p
njn  1i = 
1X
n=0
cnjni (2.25)
and comparing coecients recursively we can easily calculate
cn =
np
n!
c0 : (2.26)
From the normalization condition we nd c0 = exp ( jj2=2), thus the nal expression
for a coherent state becomes
ji = e  jj
2
2
1X
n=0
np
n!
jni : (2.27)
We can understand something more about coherent states by carrying out some
simple calculations. For example, from Eq. (2.23) and its conjugate we can compute
the expectation value of the number operator
n = hjn^ji = hjji = jj2 : (2.28)
We can therefore regard  as a complex number whose modulus is proportional to
the electric eld amplitude and thus the squared modulus to the eld intensity.
The variance of the photon number is found to be [20]
(n)2 = hj (n^  n)2 ji = n ; (2.29)
which shows that coherent states have poissonian photon number distribution.
Finally, we can calculate the probability for a coherent state to contain n photons
as
P (n) = jhnjij2 = e jj2 jj
2n
n!
= e n

nn
n!

(2.30)
which clearly proves the Poisson distribution hypotheses.
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Figure 2.1: 2x2 beam splitter with input ports (0; 1) and output ports (2; 3). Re-
ectance and transmittance are shown according to eq. (2.31).
2.2.4 Beam Splitter: from Number States to Single Photon
Interferometry
We have seen in sec. 1.2.2 how classical interference can easily be explained
by means of a wave-like description of light. At some point we had also hinted at
the similarity between interferometric results in the classical and quantum cases.
However, in order to fully understand single photon interferometry and see how
the quantum states we have just introduced are actually exploited in this eld, we
should give a quantum mechanical description of a single photon interferometer.
The building block of most interferometers is the beam splitter. In this work
3x3 beam splitters (called tritters, with three input and three output ports) have
been used. We should however look at the simpler 2x2 case rst, and then upgrade
the result to the slightly more complicated 3x3 device.
Let us suppose we have a 2x2 beam splitter as the one in Fig. 2.1. First of all we
should notice that even if we are using only one input port, it is absolutely necessary
to consider both inputs in the quantum treatment, otherwise contradictions would
raise2 (for example ladder operators commutation relations would not be preserved).
This is one of the many occasions in which vacuum turns out to be a proper quantum
state that needs to be considered.
That being made clear, we write ports with subscripts (using numbers as Fig. 2.1),
so that a^i and a^
y
i will be respectively the annihilation and creation operators for
port i. If we take r and t as the complex reectance and transmittance of the beam
2For an example with calculations, see section 6.2 in [18]
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Figure 2.2: Fiber Mach-Zehnder interferometer with input ports (0; 1), a 2x2 beam
splitter (also known as ber coupler) working in accordance to eqs. (2.33), two arms
one of which includes a  phase shift, another 2x2 coupler that recombines the pulses
into output ports (4; 5), connected respectively to detectors D0 and D1. Detection
probabilities for this setup are derived in eqs. (2.38) and (2.39).
splitter, the device transformations for the ladder operators are
a^2 = ra^1 + t
0a^0
a^3 = ta^1 + r
0a^0 :
(2.31)
Furthermore, because of energy conservation the following relations must be satised
jrj = jr0j
jtj = jt0j
jrj2 + jtj2 = 1
rt0 + r0t = 0
rt+ r0t0 = 0 :
(2.32)
We now introduce some typical hypothesis about the beam splitter: we choose to
describe a 50:50 splitter which introduces a 
2
phase shift in the reected pulse. This
type of device is made of a single dielectric layer.
Considering this choice and eqs. 2.32, eqs. 2.31 become
a^2 =
1p
2
(ia^1 + a^0)
a^3 =
1p
2
(a^1 + ia^0) :
(2.33)
We may see now how we can easily apply this formalism to a simple interferometric
ber system as in g. 2.2. The Mach-Zehnder interferometer consists of two 2x2
50:50 beam splitters and a phase modulator in one of the two arms. We may write
any input state in photon number representation as jmiijnij, meaning that we have
m photons in mode (or path) i and n in mode j.
Let us consider the input state j iin = j0i0j1i1 that is, a single photon entering
the interferometer from port 1. Taking into account eqs. 2.33 and their conjugates
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and the obvious fact that an input vacuum state transforms into an output vacuum
state, we can compute the system state after the rst beam splitter
a^y1j0i0j0i1 = j0i0j1i1 (2.34)??????y BS1
a^y1j0i2j0i3 =
1p
2

ia^y2 + a^
y
3

j0i2j0i3 = 1p
2
(ij1i2j0i3 + j0i2j1i3) : (2.35)
It should be noticed that the state coming out from the rst splitter is entangled.
It is indeed a superposition of the photon being in mode 2 or 3, with probabilities
equal to 1
2
.
Because of the phase modulator PM , the state with the photon in mode 3 will be
phase shifted by an angle 
1p
2
(ij1i2j0i3 + j0i2j1i3) PM      ! 1p
2
 
ij1i2j0i3 + eij0i2j1i3

(2.36)
With very similar calculations we can now compute the nal state after the second
beam splitter
1p
2
 
ij1i2j0i3 + eij0i2j1i3

??????y BS2
1
2

i
 
ei + 1
 j1i4j0i5 +  ei   1 j0i4j1i5 = j iout : (2.37)
The probability that detector 0 (D0 in g. 2.2) clicks corresponds to the probability
for the system to be found in the state j1i4j0i5, that is
P (D0) = jh (h1j4h0j5) j ioutj2 = 12(1 + cos) ; (2.38)
while, on the other hand
P (D1) = jh (h0j4h1j5) j ioutj2 = 12(1  cos) : (2.39)
The cos dependences clearly show the interference process going on in the system.
We should point out that the result we have just obtained is completely analogous
to the one we had previously got to in the classical formalism (see eq. 1.9). Except
that this time we have taken account of the fact that photons are indivisible, by
using photon number states.
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Figure 2.3: Mach-Zehnder three-arms ber interferometer consisting of two 3x3 trit-
ters and two phase modulators. Phase dierences dependent probabilities for the three
detectors are reported in eqs. (2.40).
We mentioned in the beginning of this section that we would have explained
how the 2x2 beam splitter results change when we have dierent beam splitters; in
particular, we should show the 3x3 unbiased beam splitter case, as this is the type
of multiport device used in this thesis work.
Consistently with what we have just seen, there is no need to carry out the cal-
culations one more time, as the result we obtain using creation and annihilation
operators for the tritter is the same as the classical scenario described by eqs. 1.14.
The only dierence of course is that in the single photon case we may interpret
intensities as probabilities, and (Ein1 )
2 = 1 (remembering that jEj2 = n).
All these things considered, the nal probabilities for a single photon 3-arms inter-
ferometer as in g. 2.3 are
P (D0) =
1
9
f3 + 2 [cos2 + cos3 + cos(2   3)]g (2.40a)
P (D1) =
1
9

3 + 2

cos

2   2
3

+ cos

3 +
2
3

+ cos

2   3 + 2
3

(2.40b)
P (D2) =
1
9

3 + 2

cos

2 +
2
3

+ cos

3   2
3

+ cos

2   3   2
3

:
(2.40c)
2.3 Quantum Information
Information is physical are the famous rst words of a 1996 Landauer's paper
[21]. Even disregarding the underlying physics the author was referring to in this
powerful sentence, one can easily agree. Any piece of information is carried - or en-
coded - in some physical way. Everyday examples are electrical pulses or magnetic
states in computers, protein sequences in genetics, light pulses in ber communi-
cation. These and every other commercially available system work within the
boundaries of classical physics, at least in the information treatment part.
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At the beginning of this chapter we mentioned how quantum physics managed, in
the rst decade of the last century, to overcome some key problems that classical
physics was suering from. But the new theory didn't just solve those problems,
it also turned out to be a groundbreaking step forward in physics and basically ev-
erything else. A question naturally comes up then: why don't we apply quantum
physics and its amazing consequences to information processing and computation?
As it always happens, it took a genius to come up with the right question. Richard
Feynman introduced the idea of a quantum computer in 1982 [22] and since then a
lot of progress has been made both theoretically and experimentally towards that
goal. Many benets of a quantum computer over a classical one have already been
proved, and they all include the idea of eciency. What do we mean by eciency?
In information science, problems are divided in complexity classes; two signicant
examples are
 Polynomial complexity class (P): the number of computer operations re-
quired to solve these problems scales as a polynomial power of the problem
size (i.e. bits)
 Non-polynomial complexity class (NP): the number of operations in-
creases with size faster than any polynomial function.
An example of a task that turns out to belong to the NP class in classical comput-
ing (it's dependence with size is actually exponential) has already been introduced
in sec. 1.1.2, when we considered prime numbers factorization. This task cannot
be solved eciently by classical computers, while it can in the quantum computing
realm (where it belongs to P-class problems). In fact, prime numbers factorization is
only one of the tasks that can be carried out more eciently by quantum computers.
Apart from computing, there are other areas where quantum physics show its supe-
riority over classical models. One of them is of course cryptography. Later in this
section we will talk about it, but in order to do it we are going to need some basic
notions about quantum information.
2.3.1 Qubits
We all know the bit, the basic unit of classical information. It can be dened
as a two-valued variable, which can be 0 or 1, or equivalently false or true. This
logical value is usually implemented in computers as on/o voltages or up/down
magnetization states.
By analogy, quantum information is built upon the qubit (short for quantum bit).
A qubit can be in one of the two logical states j0i or j1i (as we are talking about
quantum states, we are going to use the bra-ket notation as usual), but this is not
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the whole story. j0i and j1i are the two states constituting the computational basis
(hijji = i;j) of a two-dimensional Hilbert space related to our quantum system.
As we know, a quantum system can be in any superposition of the basis states;
therefore, the generic qubit state can be written as
j i = j0i+ j1i (2.41)
where as usual jj2 + jj2 = 1. A qubit state can thus be interpreted as a unit vec-
tor in a two-dimensional complex (Hilbert) space, exactly as any two-dimensional
quantum system.
However, the main dierence between classical and quantum bits comes out in the
measurement process. As a bit is either 0 or 1, whenever we perform a measurement
on it we will get exactly its state as a result. On the contrary, a measurement on
a qubit (in the computational basis) in the state (2.41) will return j0i - or more
precisely its related eigenvalue - with probability jj2 and j1i with probability jj2.
This probabilistic nature inherent in qubits may seem destabilizing at rst, but it
actually is a huge resource to build a whole new way of communicating and com-
puting.
Now that we introduced the abstract concept of qubit, we should spend some words
on how to physically realize it. Any quantum system with two easily distinguish-
able states, orthogonal to each other, can act as a qubit. Common examples are:
photon polarization (horizontal/vertical or left/right), electron spin (up/down) or
even atomic energy levels (ground/rst excited), provided that they are suciently
decoupled from the other levels. As an example, we consider a linearly polarized
photon, with horizontal and vertical polarization states acting as our computational
basis, such that for example
j0i  jHi  Horizontal
j1i  jV i  Vertical :
(2.42)
These polarization states are easily understood by looking at g. 2.4. Now suppose,
for example, that we happen to measure a diagonally (i.e. j+i - see g. 2.4) polarized
photon. We can write this state in the computational basis as
j+i = 1p
2
(jHi+ jV i) : (2.43)
At this point we can easily understand that a measurement in our chosen computa-
tional basis is going to return either H or V randomly, as jj2 and jj2 in eq. (2.41)
are both equal to 1=2 .
Now you may be wondering why we should use qubits if any measure - that is, all
we can acknowledge - is going to return only one of two values just as in the classical
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Figure 2.4: Linear polarizations space for a photon. Every point on the dashed circle
is a linear polarization state, and may be written as a linear combination of one of the
two bases
L
= fjHi; jV ig and N = fj+i; j ig. In this drawing we can also clearly
see the non orthogonality of the two bases.
bit case. The point is that any dierent linear combination (i.e. superposition)
of basis states carries dierent information; in our example, any linear polarization
(and they are innitely many) is a dierent state, therefore we can in principle store
an innite amount of information in a qubit state. Of course whenever we perform a
measurement in any basis, the system will collapse to an eigenstate of that basis, and
there goes our information! But we should notice that thanks to unitarity evolution,
all the information stored in the superposition is somehow preserved. Furthermore,
if we have more than one qubit, the number of states our system may be in increases
exponentially with the number of qubits, thus making the amount of information
huge very soon3.
We mentioned some of the simplest ways to physically realize a qubit. Slightly
more creatively, we will see that a two dimensional system can easily be built using
phase dierences of light pulses. This is indeed the way our secret sharing protocol
works.
Before getting there, however, we need to upgrade the qubit to a higher level. We
have seen that qubits are two-dimensional entities, but what about higher dimen-
sional systems?
We can in general dene a d-dimensional quantum information system as a qudit.
Given a computational basis fj0i; j1i; : : : ; jd   1ig for the qudit Hilbert space, we
3For a very comprehensive and entertaining introduction to the charms of quantum computa-
tion, look no further than [23].
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can, in analogy with eq. (2.41), write any pure state j i as superposition of the
basis states
j i =
d 1X
i=0
cijii (2.44)
where as usual any measurement in the computational basis will return i (that is
the eigenvalue of the state jii) with probability jcij2.
Of course working with higher dimensional systems has the advantage of carrying
more information with the same number of quantum systems. Nevertheless, while
in principle nothing forbids us from doing quantum communication with high di-
mensional qudits, things can get quite complicated on the experimental side. Insta-
bilities and ridiculously low generation rates (especially in the entanglement-based
protocols) may actually nullify the advantages the additional dimensions grant.
Getting back to our work, we dealt with the 3-dimensional version of qudits,
called qutrits. We will get into a more detailed explanation of the advantages of
this choice over qubits once we have the required knowledge.
Finally, we will now go through a short mathematical digression which may seem a
bit out of place, but it is actually of paramount importance for quantum communi-
cation security.
2.3.2 Mutually Unbiased Bases
Granted that we can express any state in a Hilbert space as a linear combination
of vectors making up a basis for that space, we move now one level higher in our dis-
cussion about quantum information. Hilbert spaces can have many dierent bases,
therefore making our life more complicated, apparently. But this is exactly what
makes quantum communication secure. Imagine Alice preparing a secret state in
one of many bases and sending it to Bob. Eve, the mean eavesdropper, would like
to know the state Alice sent, so she intercepts and measures it. But hang on, there
is a problem! In which one of the many possible bases is she going to perform her
measurement? If she picks the right one she will get the correct result, but even
if Alice and Bob choose to implement only two bases, she is going to get a wrong
- or at least not deterministic - result half of the times. We will discuss about
these security issues later, but we can sense some crucial doubts here: is there a
best choice for Alice and Bob when it comes to choose bases? And if there is, how
can they get to know them? Well, the latter question is way over the level of this
dissertation (and it actually is currently an open theoretical problem), but we can
still answer the former and show some results.
The answer of course is yes, and the solution for our overcautious friends is us-
ing Mutually Unbiased Bases (MUBs). They are dened in the following way:
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consider a quantum system linked to an N-dimensional Hilbert space; two bases
fje0i; je1i; : : : ; jeN 1ig and fjf0i; jf1i; : : : ; jfN 1ig for this space are mutually unbi-
ased if and only if
jheijfjij2 = 1
N
8 0  i; j  N   1 : (2.45)
Condition (2.45) can be interpreted in many ways. For sure it means that the
overlap between states belonging to MUBs is constant and independent of the states
considered. From a more practical point of view, it guarantees that if we prepare
a state in one basis and measure it in any other which is unbiased to the rst one,
every outcome is equally likely. That is, no information can be obtained about a
state if the measurement is performed in the wrong basis.
The existence of a complete set of MUBs in any dimension is an open question. It
has been proved that complete sets of N + 1 MUBs exist, rst in prime dimensions
[24] and later in any power of prime dimensions [25]. But there is no general rule
for all remaining dimensions. For example dimension 6 has been and currently is
heavily studied, with strong conjectures suggesting the existence of only three MUBs
[26].
However, the two and three-dimensional cases are well known and characterized,
and we report them here as examples.
 Two dimensions - Qubit MUBs
B1 =
 
1 0
0 1
!
B2 =
1p
2
 
1 1
1  1
!
B3 =
1p
2
 
1 1
i  i
!
(2.46)
where every matrix Bi is a basis, and columns are basis vectors. We may
notice that B1 is the computational basis, with j0i 
 
1
0

and j1i   0
1

. If
we consider photon polarization with denitions (2.42), then we can easily see
that these three MUBs correspond respectively to horizontal/vertical, diago-
nal/antidiagonal and left/right circular polarization states.
 Three dimensions - Qutrit MUBs
M1 =
0B@1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
1CA M2 = 1p
3
0B@1 1 11 ! !2
1 !2 !
1CA
M3 =
1p
3
0B@1 ! !! 1 !
! ! 1
1CA M4 = 1p
3
0B@ 1 !2 !2!2 1 !2
!2 !2 1
1CA
(2.47)
with ! = e
i2
3 .
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It is clear that these denitions satisfy condition (2.45). For example, naming vectors
in bra-ket notation as jMi(j)i with j = 0; 1; 2 indicating the matrix column, we can
calculate the squared inner product of a vector from M2 with one from M3:
jhM2(2)jM3(2)ij2 = 1
9


1 !2 !
0B@!1
!
1CA

2
=
1
9
! + !2 + !22 =
=
1
9
e i23 + 2e i43 2 = 1
9
 32 + i
p
3
2

2
=
1
3
:
(2.48)
We will see how the protocol we used for quantum communication takes advantage
of three dimensional MUBs and their unique properties.
At this point we are ready to introduce the subject which this experimental work
has focused on, that is quantum cryptography.
Chapter 3
Quantum Cryptography
3.1 Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum cryptography is the extremely fascinating eld that studies innovative
ways to solve classical cryptographic problems by using special features uniquely
possessed by quantum mechanical systems. Its applications range from military se-
curity to card games [27]. This experimental work focused on the so-called quantum
secret sharing (QSS) problem, which will be introduced in the following of this chap-
ter. Indeed we shall rst concentrate on the most studied and developed problem in
the quantum cryptography eld, that is quantum key distribution (QKD). We will
see that QSS has many similarities with QKD, and can almost be interpreted as a
generalization to many users.
We mentioned in sec. 1.1.2 that commercial - but also military - cryptographic
protocols are currently based on public-key cyphers, and we pointed out in an almost
arrogant way that these methods are not secure. Well, quantum mechanics not only
oers an unconditionally secure way to encrypt private information, but it also
allows us to do it through a public (i.e. not protected) channel. Let us explain
this. The main weakness of any classical cypher is the secret key exchange: when
Alice sends her decrypting key to Bob, for example by e-mail of phone, she has no
way to be sure that Eve has not intercepted the transmission and is not aware of
the key, unless maybe if she personally delivers it to Bob. But suppose that Bob
is the US president and Alice is his best secret agent acting undercover somewhere
in a very hostile country. How can they possibly meet? All it takes for them to
solve this problem is some hundred-thousands of dollars worth of optical equipment
- which is surely no problem for them - and a good ber optical network.
Apart from this unlikely (or maybe not that much) scenario, the crucial point is that
quantum cryptography is not focused on the encryption part of a secure communi-
cation, but rather on the key distribution process. Once Alice has sent her secret
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key to Bob by means of a secure QKD protocol, they can use for example a one-time
pad method, which has been proved to be unbreakable (see sec. 1.1.1 and [8]), to
encrypt their messages, and be comfortably positive about their shared secrets.
But how does QKD works precisely, and why is it unconditionally secure?
While classical cryptography needs very special (and often expensive) precautions
to make sure that no eavesdropper is intercepting the secret key, thus keeping the
communication channel secure, QKD oers a failsafe way to know easily when some-
one is listening to our communications, therefore letting us exchange information
through public channels while being sure that no one is listening.
What basically happens is that Alice sends a key to Bob through a public unpro-
tected channel, and if this is intercepted by Eve then quantum mechanics assures us
that Alice and Bob get to know it, thus discarding the key and creating a new one.
As soon as they manage to have a shared secret key, they can encrypt and decrypt
messages.
On a slightly more physical level, what prevents Eve from eavesdropping without
being unmasked is the fact that any measurement on a quantum state aects the
state itself, i.e. it projects the state on the basis the measurement is performed in,
thus resulting in the system being in a state belonging to that basis, not necessarily
the same as before the measurement (see sec. 2.1.2). Technically, Alice and Bob are
sure that Eve cannot copy a state without modifying it thanks to the no-cloning
theorem we proved in sec. 2.1.4. Of course this is true provided that there is only
one copy of the system transmitted between the users. We will get into more details
on the security of QKD later.
We should point out that there are two basic types of QKD, one involving entan-
gled particles and the other using single particles. While the former may be more
fascinating from a fundamental point of view, here we are going to present only sin-
gle particle schemes, as these are incredibly simpler to understand and implement,
and far more common in the eld. Moreover, we will discuss exclusively photon
based QKD, which is basically the only type deeply studied and implemented.
We will now introduce an extremely simple protocol for QKD from which most of the
currently realized systems are developed. It is based on qubits encoded in photon
polarization.
3.1.1 BB84 Protocol
Early proposals to exploit quantum mechanics in order to establish secure cryp-
tography date back to the early '70s, when Stephen Wiesner submitted his Conju-
gate Coding paper to the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, unfortunately
only to see it rejected. It took some more years and lots of discussions between that
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same physicist and two of his friends, Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard, before
the rst protocol for QKD was invented and published1 in 1984 [1].
The original scheme was based on photon polarization encoding, and this is how we
are going to present it as it is the simplest way to understand the principles behind
it.
The protocol uses qubits encoded in two MUBs, for example we choose the horizon-
tal/vertical and the diagonal/anti-diagonal bases, that is matrices B1 and B2 in eq.
(2.46). Looking at the notation we used in g. 2.4, we can rename vectors in a more
convenient way using Dirac's notation 
1
0
!
 jHi
 
0
1
!
 jV i
1p
2
 
1
1
!
 jHi+ jV ip
2
 j+i 1p
2
 
1
 1
!
 jHi   jV ip
2
 j i :
(3.1)
From these denitions, and from the fact that we are using MUBs, it is clear that
states belonging to dierent bases are not orthogonal to each other. We will see that
this is exactly where the security comes from.
Anyway, back to the protocol, Alice and Bob want to establish a binary key, so they
need to agree on each vector representing either 0 or 1 for example as in tab.
3.1.
basisL
: horizontal/vertical
N
: diagonal/anti-diagonal
bit
0 jHi j+i
1 jV i j i
Table 3.1: Given the two mutually unbiased bases used in the protocol, one vector
from each basis represents either 0 or 1.
At this point, having established a public quantum channel (e.g. optical ber
or free space) and a public classical channel, as phone or email, Alice and Bob are
ready to take the following steps:
1. Alice randomly generates a bit and randomly chooses one of the two bases.
The randomness of these choices is of course crucial if she wants her data to
be unpredictable. Depending on the outcomes, she prepares a photon in the
1It actually took a meeting in the pool af a Caribbean posh hotel, by the beach in San Juan,
as Brassard himself explains in a very entertaining paper on the history of quantum cryptography
[28].
32 Quantum Cryptography
correct polarization state according to tab. 3.1, and she sends it to Bob trough
the quantum channel after registering its polarization and time of departure.
So, for example, if she randomly generated (1;
L
), she will send a vertically
polarized photon (i.e. jV i).
2. Bob receives the photon and, unaware of the basis Alice encoded it in, he
randomly picks either
L
or
N
and performs a measurement in that basis.
The outcome will be unconditionally correct (save for experimental errors or
eavesdropping) if he happens to choose the same basis as Alice, otherwise
thanks to the dening property (2.45) of MUBs the outcome will be random.
He nally registers time of arrival, measurement basis and outcome.
3. After having checked that traveling times are constant (and possibly make
sense too), Alice and Bob share through the classical channel their basis
choices: they discard every run in which they picked dierent bases, and keep
the rest. This process will result in them having strings of bits which will be
in average half the number of runs, as Bob will randomly choose the wrong
basis half of the times. During this process only the basis choices are revealed,
while the vector choices and measurements (i.e. the bit values) are kept secret.
4. Bob and Alice now perform a security check on the sifted key: they share a
statistically relevant amount of bits and compare their values; if no eavesdrop-
ping happened (and the experimental setup was perfect) the shared bits will
be totally identical and the two friends can be sure that Eve has no informa-
tion about the key. On the contrary, if there are errors in the sample then
they can argue that Eve has probably gained some information, in which case
they just discard the key and run the whole process again from the rst step,
possibly on a dierent quantum channel.
5. If the key generation was successful, they can apply for example a one-time
pad method to encrypt their message with the key they have just established,
and share it through the classical channel, being condent that Eve does not
possess the key to decrypt it.
We can see a practical example of a key generation process following the BB84
protocol in tab. 3.2.
This protocol is extremely simple and easy to implement in a lab. However, we
should mention some common sources of errors aecting any real QKD implemen-
tation:
 Random deletion of photons: this source of errors and problems aects
every implementation. It frequently happens that while Alice has sent a pho-
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Alice
bit 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
basis
L N N N L N L L N
state jHi j+i j i j+i jV i j i jV i j+i j i
Bob
basis
L L N L L N N L L
outcome 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
basis check X  X  X X  X 
sifted key 0 1 1 1 0
error check? yes no yes no no
secure key 1 1 0
Table 3.2: Secure key generation with BB84 protocol. In this case there has been no
eavesdropping.
ton, Bob registers no click in any detector, as if the photon had never left the
source. This may be caused by absorption or scattering by the setup, or by
detection eciencies. Depending on the specic conguration, the attenuation
from the single photon source to the detectors may be of many dozens of deci-
bels, and detection eciency usually goes from 10% to 70% with commercially
available photodetectors. There factors however, while considerably reducing
the key generation rate, are innocuous from the security point of view, as Alice
will simply discard any run which Bob has not measured.
 Birefringence and noisy quantum channel: this is a serious problem for
protocols using polarization, as standard commercial bers are birefringent,
thus they introduce changes in the polarization during the photon transmis-
sion. This is why most protocols nowadays use phase encoding for which
birefringence is not a big problem. We shall see anyway, that these other type
of implementations suer from interferometric instabilities and require other
countermeasures.
 Detector dark counts: this problem is caused by thermal detections in
photodiodes. Every time a photon gets lost in the transmission, it is still
possible for Bob to register a click in a random detector because of the thermal
excitations inside the photocathode. This problem becomes really important
for low-eciency detectors and highly attenuating setups, and even more if
gated biased photodetectors are used, as in our case. The solution is to reduce
the attenuation as much as possible and nd a good compromise between dark
counts and eciency.
All the aforementioned problems may be solved by using error correction algorithms,
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whose nal eect is a reduction of the key length, or equivalently, of the generation
rate.
But what about security against external threats? Let's see how Eve could use
her innite budget to hack this - and actually almost any other - QKD protocol.
3.1.2 Security against eavesdropping
Many dierent types of attacks have been invented and subsequently neutralized
during the years, thanks to the unstoppable creative power of scientists. We have
said more than once that QKD is a priori unbreakable because of the fundamental
principles of quantum mechanics (and thus nature which seems to adapt pretty well
to this theory) that lead to the no-cloning theorem. Unfortunately, theories are
always approximations of real-world experiments, or rather their ideal counterparts.
In fact, even if Eve cannot attack the principles of quantum mechanics, she can
surely exploit any technological and experimental weakness in Alice's and Bob's
setups. For this reason when we introduced Eve in sec. 1.1.2, we said that she has
access to any feasible technology - and then some - to be bought with unlimited
money.
We should say from the beginning that this work has not taken care of all the
countermeasures against the technological attacks we are now going to present, as
they usually consist in some additional equipment or error correction algorithm, and
this work has been focused mainly on a proof-of-principle of the proposed protocol.
Nonetheless, it is important to have an idea of the problems any real-world QKD
implementation has to face.
 Intercept and resend: this is the simplest type of attack Eve can perform.
She basically cuts the transmission line halfway between Alice and Bob and
measures the state. She then sends to Bob a new system in the same state
she got from the measurement. As she is not aware of which basis the state
she receives is encoded in, she will choose the wrong basis 50% of the times,
in which cases if Bob measures the state in the same basis Alice encoded it
in, he will get the state wrong in half the runs. The total error introduced by
Eve is then in average 50% 50% = 25%. This attack can be easily detected
in the error checking part of the protocol (step number 4). Actually, Eve
could use better bases for the attack and get help from others (in a so-called
coherent attack). It has been proved that the minimum error introduced by
the optimal cloning attack to a QKD protocol is 11% in the qubit case and
15:95% if qutrits are used [4]. If Alice and Bob obtain an error rate lower than
these thresholds, they are sure that no such attack has been performed.
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 Photon number splitting: in real QKD implementations weak pulsed lasers
attenuated much below the single photon level are used. Usually average
intensities as low as 0:1 photons per pulse are used, but as the photon number
distribution is Poissonian (see sec. 2.2.3), there is always a small probability
that more than one photon is sent in one pulse. If Alice sends two photons,
Eve can split them, keeping one in a quantum memory and sending the other
to Bob, and then measure it after the bases announcement. There are many
countermeasures against this attack. The best solution would certainly be to
use a true single photon source. Even though modern implementations of these
sources still have low generation rates, experiments have been run with them
[29], thus setting high expectations for their future use. The best solution
is employing decoy states, which consist in randomly sending pulses with a
dierent average number of photon. Successful realizations of these protocols
have been attained [30][3].
 Man-in-the-middle: this is a weakness that QKD shares with any other
cryptographic protocol. In fact, nothing guarantees to Alice that the person
she thinks is Bob actually is...Eve! The solution to this problem requires the
step of identity verication, for which well-known classical procedures exist
and can be applied. However, they all require a previously shared secret key,
for which it may be necessary for Alice and Bob to meet face to face una
tantum before starting their secret sharing.
Finally, we should say that other attacks exploiting particular congurations have
been carried out, but they can all usually be solved by means of some setup modi-
cations or improvement.
In conclusion, the BB84 protocol looks extremely useful and well-built for QKD,
but it has one major aw in its polarization implementation, that is the birefringence
problem we discussed above. A possible, and actually almost universally accepted,
solution is to use instead an interferometric setup with phase encoding.
3.1.3 QKD with phase encoding - the Plug&Play congura-
tion
In order to implement a real-world QKD system, we need it to work over long
distances. For example, we can think of running a protocol over telecommunication
optical bers, which means over a hundred of kilometers between repeaters. These
commercial bers are not polarization maintaining and due to environmental changes
they are strongly - and randomly - birefringent. Thus polarization is not the way to
go in the real-world scenario.
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Figure 3.1: Qubit QKD interferometric setup with phase encoding ('A; 'B). The
source is either truly single photon or an attenuated pulsed laser.
A good solution is a somehow slightly dierent realization of the BB84 protocol,
with interferometry and phase encoding instead of polarization states. Suppose
Alice and Bob use an interferometric setup as in g. 3.1. We know from sec. 2.2.4
that the measurement outcome depends on the relative phase between the two arms
pulses, namely  = j'A   'Bj in our gure. But then we can easily establish two
MUBs and perform the BB84 protocol just as in the polarization case. For example
we can take the angles f0; g as one basis and f
2
; 3
2
g as the other. Whenever Alice
and Bob both choose the same basis the total phase dierence  will be a multiple of
, thus giving a click in a denite detector with probability 100%, otherwise  = 
2
or  = 3
2
, thus giving random detections as we can see from eqs. (2.38) and (2.39),
just as in the polarization case when Bob measures in the wrong basis. Actually,
exactly as in that case, Bob only needs to choose the basis, that is, choose between
angles 0 and 
2
. You can nd all the possible cases in tab. 3.3, where we supposed
that detector 0 and 1 correspond respectively to bit values 0 and 1.
This version of the BB84 protocol is denitely the most common in the QKD
Alice's bit 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
'A 0 0  

2

2
3
2
3
2
'B 0

2
0 
2
0 
2
0 
2
 = j'A   'Bj 0 2  2 2 0 32 
Bob's outcome 0 random 1 random random 0 random 1
Table 3.3: BB84 protocol with phase encoding. The MUBs are f0; g and f2 ; 32 g.
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eld and it has been successfully applied both in the lab and in commercial system.
However, setups as the one in g. 3.1 are not what is really used by scientists
and engineers all over the world. In fact, if we imagine Alice and Bob to be a
hundred kilometers apart, these setups would require to balance ridiculously long
interferometers, which is in practice impossible. The best solution to this problem
is to use an automatically balanced interferometer, as in g. 3.2.
In this case, thanks to the polarization beam splitter (PBS) and the Faraday mirror
(FM) the two pulses go through exactly the same lengths - actually even the same
physical bers - but in opposite traveling directions. Let's see how this setup works:
a light pulse (for simplicity we suppose it is horizontally polarized) gets splitted by
the 50:50 ber coupler (FC). The half going through the short (S) arm is transmitted
without any change by the PBS, while the long (L) arm pulse is rotated by 90
degrees. During the way to the FM both Bob's and Alice's phase modulators (PM)
are o. The FM then reects back the two pulses while transforming them into
their orthogonal polarization states, that is vertical for the rst one and horizontal
for the second one. Now the attenuator (ATT) lowers their intensities to the single
photon level and secure encryption can take place. Alice modulates the rst pulse
while doing nothing to the second one. Then at the PBS the early pulse, which is
vertically polarized, gets reected into the L arm and rotated back to horizontal,
while the late pulse, already horizontally polarized, simply goes through the PBS.
Now Bob can modulate the early pulse - which is traveling along the L arm - and
at the FC the two halves recombine and interfere just like we want, having traveled
exactly the same paths.
There have been many successful realizations of QKD experiments with this type of
conguration, over dozens of kilometers of ber [3][31].
Having seen the most common realization of QKD with qubits, we shall now
Figure 3.2: Plug&Play QKD setup with an automatically balanced interferometer.
Detailed description in sec. 3.1.3.
38 Quantum Cryptography
move on to the very similar qutrits case.
3.1.4 QKD with qutrits
Knowing how the BB84 protocol works in the easiest case, we can now describe
an upgraded version of the same type of protocol for the three dimensional case,
that is for qutrits. This upgrade has two main advantages over the standard qubit
version
 Denser coding: of course having three possible outcomes from every mea-
surement is better than two. To understand why, just compare any big number
written in binary system with the same number in base three!
 Enhanced security: this cannot be so easily understood. The main point
is how good Eve can clone a generic state used in the protocol. It turns
out that an optimal cloning machine gets worse with increasing dimensions
[4], and as we have already mentioned in sec. 3.1.2, the upper boundary for
qutrits error rate (QTER) is 15:95% for coherent attacks (where Eve keeps
many photons in memory and measure them at the same time), while it is
11% for qubits.
An other potential advantage is the possibility to use more MUBs, as their number
increases for higher dimensions, at least for power of prime ones (see sec. 2.3.2).
This of course makes Eve's life harder, as she has to guess between more basis, but it
also decreases the number of bits that pass the key-sifting part, as Bob will measure
in the right basis less often too, thus causing lower generation rates.
Anyway, QKD for qutrits works very similarly to the qubits case. Photon polariza-
tion cannot be used this time, since polarization state space is two dimensional, but
phase encoding can instead be adopted. The generalization of the BB84 protocol to
three dimensions consists in the two users working with two of the three dimensional
MUBs in eq. (2.47). In analogy with g. 3.1, the simplest setup they can use is
reported in g. 3.3.
Choosing for example vector jM2(1)i =

1 ! !2
T
means adding phases '1 =
! = e
i2
3 to the pulse in arm 1 and '2 = !2 = e
i4
3 to the pulse in arm 2. As we
can see from eqs. (2.40), the nal probability to have a click in one detector will be
unitary if Alice and Bob chose the same basis, otherwise detection will be random.
We should comment again that a setup as in g. 3.3 is quite inconvenient because
of interferometric instabilities. Unfortunately, no automatically balanced interfer-
ometer can be built for the three dimensional case (as there must be three dierent
paths), but there are much better congurations than this, as we will see for example
when we explain our own setup.
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Figure 3.3: Qutrit QKD setup. The interferometer must me carefully balanced in
order to have good visibilities. For this reason (and because it needs three ber
channels between Alice and Bob) this is not the best setup, however it is useful to
understand the basics of qutrit QKD.
3.2 Quantum Secret Sharing
In this case, a somehow classical example is: suppose there is group of high
commanders in a very belligerent country that is in charge of an extremely powerful
nuclear arsenal (hopefully it won't ring any bell). Now, what happens if one of these
men one day feels particularly irritated and decides to launch a missile against some
opposite group/organization? For sure the launch will need at least a password
from each commander (here is an example of secret sharing), but then how can we
be sure that this lunatic had not intercepted all the other's passwords during the
initial distribution process and kept them hidden knowing that a bad day would
have eventually come?
Secret sharing protocols aim at solving these kind of problems by splitting a secret
among dierent users, in such a way that one or more of them (but not all of course)
cannot reconstruct it without the collaboration of the others.
There are classical solutions for these issues, but as you may guess they all require
some secure communications between users, therefore being susceptible to eaves-
dropping attacks. But wait a minute! We know that quantum communication can
do that! This problem is somewhat similar to the key distribution problem then,
except that in this case there usually is a distributor splitting the secret and giving
one part to each of many users, and this distributor has to take care not only of any
external eavesdropper, but also of one or more possible traitors inside the sharing
group.
Contrary to the QKD case, the rst papers reporting QSS protocols exploited entan-
glement [32, 33]. Nevertheless, QSS was successfully carried out later using only one
particle with interferometry and phase encoding [34, 3]. All these experiments have
been realized with qubits. After an initial explanation of the two dimensional phase
encoding case, we will present the protocol for qudits we used and our particular
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Figure 3.4: Plug&Play QSS setup using qubits. In this example there are RN parties.
implementation.
3.2.1 QSS with qubits
The QSS method for N users we are going to present is based on the BB84
protocol we have seen in sec. 3.1.1. Our exposition will basically report the protocol
introduced in ref. [3], as per the setup in g. 3.4.
1. As in the BB84 protocol, a qubit is initially prepared in the state
j+i = 1p
2
(j0i+ j1i) (3.2)
by the rst user R1 2.
2. Each user Rn from R1 to RN 1 acts sequentially on the received qubit with
the unitary operator
U^('n) = j0ih0j+ ei'n j1ih1j (3.3)
where 'n is one of four angles divided in the two mutually unbiased bases
f0; g and f
2
; 3
2
g. Sounds familiar? These are exactly the same setting
applied to the same qubits of the BB84 QKD protocol described in sec. 3.1.1.
And precisely as in that case,
3. RN chooses only the basis, that is he picks either 'n = 0 or 'n = 2 . The
qubit will nally be in the state
j Ni = 1p
2

j0i+ ei
PN
n=1 'n j1i

(3.4)
2Actually in a Plug&Play setup as in g. 3.4 and [3], RN both prepares and measure the qubit.
However, nothing changes in the mathematical and physical properties of the protocol.
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In the end he measures the qubit in the
N
= fj+i = 1p
2
(j0i+ j1i) ; j i =
1p
2
(j0i   j1i)g basis. Again, very similarly to the BB84 case, the probabilities
of the outcomes will be
1
4
jh+j Nij2 = P (D0) = 1
2
(1 + cos
NX
n=1
'n)
1
4
jh j Nij2 = P (D1) = 1
2
(1  cos
NX
n=1
'n) :
(3.5)
as per eqs. (2.38) and (2.39).
4. The parties reveal in reverse order the bases they used on a public channel.
From this information they know which runs gave a unitary probability for one
detector and zero for the other (we call these deterministic runs) and which
returned random results. These second type of runs get at this point discarded,
and in average half of the measurements will remain (as in the key-sifting part
of BB84).
Whenever the run is deterministic, N   1 users can calculate the remaining
party's phase by sharing their own setting among each other, thus achieving
the goal of secret sharing.
We should point out that the reverse order in the basis revealing part is due to
security reason, so that any cheating from user Rn may become harmless.
Finally we would like to mention a crucial advantage of the single particle protocols
over the entanglement ones, that is scalability. In fact, suppose we have ten users:
if Alice wants to run an entanglement-based QSS protocol, she needs to generate
ten entangled systems for every run and perform at least ten measurements at the
same time. This is gonna result in a ridiculously low generation rate, if any at all.
If you also consider the imperfect (euphemistically speaking) detection eciency ,
the rate will decrease as N because every user adds his own detectors. In the single
particle version instead, adding users simply means having higher attenuation, which
is not such a big problem, and can in principle be solved with better equipment.
Moreover, the number of detectors is constant, and such is detection eciency.
We will now present a more general protocol for higher dimensional QSS.
3.2.2 QSS with qudits
QSS has been experimentally achieved both with entanglement-based [33] and
single particle [34, 3] protocols. However, these implementations employed qubits.
Using higher dimensional systems gives the same advantages we talked about in the
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QKD case (see sec. 3.1.4), namely denser coding and higher security bound-
aries. It is interesting then to explore the possibility of higher dimensionality for
QSS methods. Therefore, we are now going to present a generic protocol valid for
any prime number dimension except for two, which we have already explained in
the previous section anyway. This scheme has been proposed in [6], and this work
is part of its experimental realization.
First, we need to introduce few mathematical objects, some new and others simply
written in a more convenient notation.
As you may guess at this point, the protocol is going to use MUBs. We can write ev-
ery basis as fjsjl ig, where j = 0; :::; d 1 3 species the basis and l = 0; :::; d 1 labels
the vector in basis j. We can then remind the MUBs dening condition rewritten
in a slightly more precise way than eq. (2.45), that ishsjl jsj0l0 i2 = 1d (1  j;j0) + j;j0l;l0 ; (3.6)
while all the d MUBs vectors can be written as
jsjl i =
1p
d
d 1X
k=0
!k(l+jk)jki (3.7)
where ! = e
i2
d . This denition is consistent with eq. (2.47).
Now we introduce two new unitary operators whose combined actions on any MUB
vector jsjl i can return any other vector jsj
0
l0 i in the MUBs set, and no other vector
outside this set.
The rst operator is
X^d =
d 1X
m=0
!mjmihmj ; (3.8)
and by applying it on a generic vector in our set we get
X^djsjl i =
1p
d
d 1X
m=0
!mjmihmj
d 1X
k=0
!k(l+jk)jki
=
1p
d
d 1X
k=0
!k((l+1)+jk)jki = jsjl+1i :
(3.9)
We have shown that the action of X^d is to increase the vector index, thus by applying
it several times to any state we can get any other state in the same MUB.
3It is worth noticing that we are using only d MUBs, even though we know (see sec. 2.3.2)
that in prime d dimensions we have d + 1 MUBs. This happens because the computational basis
is of no use in this protocol.
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The second operator as you may guess will change the basis, that is index j. We
dene it as
Y^d =
d 1X
m=0
!m
2 jmihmj (3.10)
and its action is
Y^djsjl i =
1p
d
d 1X
m=0
!m
2 jmihmj
d 1X
k=0
!k(l+jk)jki
=
1p
d
d 1X
k=0
!k(l+(j+1)k)jki = jsj+1l i :
(3.11)
As we anticipated, Y^d increases the basis index j, and its multiple application will
give us any basis in the MUBs set.
Therefore, we see that we can easily map jsjl i into any other vector jsj
0
l0 i just by
combining the actions of these two operators elevated to some powers, while being
sure that we will obtain no vector outside our set.
We are now ready to present the protocol, which involves N users that act sequen-
tially on the same qudit system.
1. R1, the distributor, prepares the qudit system in the initial state
j 0i = js00i =
1p
d
d 1X
k=0
jki : (3.12)
2. Sequentially, every user Rn with n = 1; :::; N   1 generates two independent
random numbers xn; yn 2 f0; :::; d   1g, acts on the received qudit with the
transformation
X^xnd Y^
yn
d j n 1i = j ni (3.13)
and nally forward the obtained qudit to the next party, that is Rn+1.
3. The last user, RN , applies X^
xN
d Y^
yN
d , getting the nal state
j Ni =
NY
n=1
X^xnd Y^
yn
d j 0i =
1p
d
d 1X
k=0
!
PN
n=1(kxn+k2yn)jki : (3.14)
He then performs a measurement in the basis fjs0l ig, and announces on a
public channel the outcome a 2 f0; :::; d  1g, which at this point none of the
parties knows if it is deterministic or random.
4. All the users R2; :::; RN 1, in random order, announce their yn. R1 and RN do
it after everyone else, again in random order. This is important for security
reasons.
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5. Here comes the usual key-sifting part: if and only if the condition
NX
n=1
yn = 0 mod d (3.15)
is satised, then the nal state j Ni was an eigenstate of the measurement
operator, that is, j Ni 2 fjs0l ig. The run is then valid and equation
NX
n=1
xn = a mod d (3.16)
produces the shared secret, that is the set fxng. This happens averagely in 1d
of the runs. If, instead, condition (3.15) is not satised, the run is discarded.
6. As in every other protocol we have analyzed, all users announce on the public
channel a statistically relevant part of their choices for xn, in order to check
inconsistencies with eq. (3.16).
We can at this point dene a qudit error rate (QDER) as
QDER =
Cw
Cr + Cw
=
Cw
CTOT
(3.17)
where Cr is the number of valid runs which produced detections in the right
output (i.e. eq. (3.16) is satised as expected), Cw the ones that violated eq.
(3.16), by causing detections in a wrong output, and CTOT is obviously the
total amount of valid runs. This denition represents the error rate in the
communication, and is commonly used in literature [5].
Back to the protocol, if the error rate is below the security threshold, than
the shared secret is secure and at least N   1 parties need to collaborate in
order to solve eq. (3.16), thus nding out the remaining user's choice of xn
and reconstructing the whole secret fxng.
We should point out once more that the single particle has the advantage of
being highly scalable with respects to the entanglement version, because of course
it doesn't require any entangled-particles generation and the number of detectors
is constantly d, thus making detection (in)eciency independent of the number of
users.
Security of the protocol
We can basically have two dierent types of attacks:
 Intercept and resend: this is the same threat we have explained in sec. 3.1.2
for the QKD case. Exactly as in that protocol, if the QDER calculated in step
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6 is lower than a secure threshold value, than the parties can safely assume
that this attack has not been performed, or was not successful. We should
point out again that higher dimensions have more relaxed security conditions
[4].
The other attacks we described for QKD (namely photon number splitting and
man-in-the-middle) have the same consequences and solutions in QSS.
 Cheating parties: this security threat is characteristic of secret sharing
schemes. Suppose one of the users would like to cheat and gain some in-
formation on other users' choices of xn. A potentially dangerous way to do
this could be by storing the state he receives from the previous user in a quan-
tum memory and send instead one of two entangled qudits, while keeping the
other [35]. If in step 4 every other user announces his yn before our cheater,
then he could gain some information without being detected, such that by
collaborating with other cheating users, a subset of less than N   1 parties
could reconstruct the whole secret.
Unfortunately for the cheater, the random way users announce their yn pre-
vents this possibility.
Security is instead not guaranteed if more than one cheater collaborate. How-
ever even in this case the probability for a successful attack can be made
arbitrarily small by running the protocol more times. For example, it can be
shown [6] that in the worst case scenario where there are N   2 collaborating
cheaters, 35 valid runs give a successful attack probability of 0:001 for N = 11.
We will see in the following chapter how this protocol has been experimentally
applied to a three dimensional case, therefore proving that it could be implemented
in order to achieve secret sharing.
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Chapter 4
The Experiment
4.1 Setup and Equipment
In sec. 3.2.2 we have presented, theoretically, a protocol for an innovative ap-
proach to secret sharing, for any number of parties and in d dimensions (with d
any prime number dierent from two). This chapter will discuss our experimen-
tal implementation of a three dimensional (i.e. qutrits) version of that proposed
scheme: it will be shown that, save for some (reasonable) technical limitations, the
system produces the expected results with error rates that are well below the secu-
rity thresholds.
The technical problems mentioned above are due to the particular experimental
realization of the setup, and will likely be solvable by future developements.
We start this chapter by presenting the experimental setup we built, pictured
in g. 4.1. It is a three arms Mach-Zehnder-like interferometric system
completely realized with optical bers. The core or this conguration are two 3x3
ber splitters (usually called tritters). Along the tritters arms and in every user's
station (see g. 4.1), relative phases can be actively controlled by lithium niobate
electro-optic phase modulators (PMs) driven by pulse generators. Thus, we can
precisely govern the interference pattern at the setup outputs. The whole system
is handled by computer software written in LabVIEW code. The conguration is
Plug&Play-like (see sec. 3.1.3), in the sense that there is a mirror after the tritter
system that reects light back to the single photon detectors. This way, by a precise
timings combination (see g. 4.2), the pulses going through the long and short
arms exchange paths in the way back, while the middle pulse travels through the
medium arm twice. The main advantage is that, since there is no known way to
build a true Plug&Play three-arms interferometer, at least two of them - i.e. the
long and short ones - are automatically balanced, limiting the manual balancing to
the medium arm only. Other standard ber components employed are a circulator,
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Figure 4.1: Setup used in this work. The components are: digital attenuator (ATT),
circulator (CIR), two tritters (TRIT1 and TRIT2), phase modulators (PM), long and
middle arms delays (respectively DLL and DLM), polarization controller (PC), Quan-
tum Composer pulse generator (QC), P400 pulse generator (P400) and three single
photon detectors D0, D1 and D2.
a polarization controller and of course ber connectors. The photon source is a 1550
nm externally triggered diode laser strongly attenuated to single photon level by a
variable attenuator.
All the bers except for a long delay line and the mirror are polarization maintaining,
and only polarization maintaining arms of the tritters have been used.
We will now proceed with a more detailed walk through of the setup and a short
description of the main components. In the following section we will describe the
protocol presented in sec. 3.2.2 adapted to our conguration, and from a more
experimental point of view.
After the desired transformations are set in the LabVIEW software, the PC
sends them to an FPGA card, that triggers the Quantum Composer pulse generator
(QC) and the P400 pulse generator (P400). The FPGA card also sets clock and
frequency of every run. The QC then triggers the laser source. The pulse gets
attenuated by the digital attenuator (ATT) enough to have 0:1 photons per pulse
right after Charlie's station, and goes trough the circulator (CIR) and to the rst
tritter (TRIT1), where it is splitted in three. The pulse in the short (S) arm is our
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Figure 4.2: Pulses order at the interferometer output. Every square is a pulse, and its
colors encode the arms the pulse has gone through, where red=short, green=medium
and blue=long. For example, the square represents a pulse that has traveled through
the long arm in the way in and the short arm in the way out. Only the middle
(composite) pulse is of our interest, since it contains the whole qutrit.
j0i, the one in the medium (M) arm is j1i and in the long (L) arm we have j2i.
Delays DLL and DLM are respectively equal to (63:40 0:05) ns and (126:75 0:05)
ns.
After the second tritter (TRIT2) the three pulses go through the long single mode
delay line ((244:02  0:05) ns) which changes their polarization from horizontal
to elliptical. Since the phase modulators (PM) have an horizontal polarizer at the
output, a polarization controller (PC) after the long delay line changes polarizations
back to horizontal, and the pulses get to the mirror and reected. During the whole
way to the mirror, all the PMs are o.
After the reection, modulation starts: the FPGA card triggers the P400 that drives
Charlie's PM rst and then Bob's PM, according to the parameters we set in the
software and at the perfect timing for every pulse. Each one of them is then splitted
in three again by TRIT2 and at this point the QC drives the voltages in Alice's
PMs. The three pulses arrive at TRIT1 at the same time and interfere. The QC
now triggers the gated detectors that send a TTL pulse for every detection to the
FPGA card that counts them.
It is worth noting that since the three pulses arriving at TRIT2 on the way back get
splitted in three again, in the end we will have ve composite pulses coming out of
the interferometer, as in g. 4.2.
This almost-Plug&Play conguration has one main advantage over a Mach-
Zehnder like setup, which would have an exact copy of Alice's tritter system at
Charlie's station to make the pulses interfere: in our setup we only need DLL =
2DLM in order to balance the interferometer. An other tritter system would need
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Figure 4.3: Photo of the setup in an early stage. For acronyms explanation see g.
4.1
two more delay lines exactly identical (up to 1 cm - or 0:05 ns) to DLL and DLM.
In g. 4.3 we reported a photo of the experimental setup during its realization.
4.1.1 Passive Optical Components
Optical Fibers
While most commercial and industrial bers are multimode (MMF), in the quan-
tum optics research eld an other type is more interesting, i.e. single mode bers
(SMF). These have a much thinner core (see g. 4.4), and allow only one guided
mode for signals having a wavelenght close to the operational design (i.e. 1550 nm
in our case).
A big problem with using bers in the lab is silica birefringence. In fact, every
Figure 4.4: Longitudinal sections of dierent types of commercial bers. The pictured
PMF is called Panda conguration PMF, and it is the one we used throughout the
whole setup.
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ber has fast and slow axes, and since their alignment depends on the stress induced
on the core, polarization cannot be practically controlled. To solve this problem, a
special kind of SMF has been invented, that is polarization maintaining ber (PMF).
PMFs have carefully localized defects (in the form of plastic rods aligned with the
ber cylindrical axis) in the cladding that cause strong stresses to the core, thus
making external disturbances mainly negligible (see g. 4.4). However, PMFs really
preserve polarization only along the slow axis, therefore we need to align them care-
fully every time we make connections. More or less precise mating sleeves can help
us doing this, but of course this problem will aect our interferometric visibility.
In our setup, we used only polarization maintaining 1550 nm bers, except for the
long delay line between Charlie and Bob and the mirror, which are normal SMFs
(of course 1550 nm). Their polarization changes are canceled by a polarization con-
troller on the way to the mirror and by Bob's and Charlie's horizontal polarizers at
their PMs output on the way back.
Finally, we should say that modern SMFs have an average attenuation of 0:25 db/km,
that is, intensities are halved every 12 kilometers. However in our setup, which falls
way short of a kilometer, this attenuation is utterly negligible - also compared to
basically every other component.
Circulator
Figure 4.5: Fiber optics circulator.
An optical circulator (see g. 4.5) is a three-ports device that directs light
incoming from port i to port i+1, while having very high attenuation rates (as high
as an isolator, i.e. around 40 db) along the opposite way. For this reason, it is a
non-reciprocal optical component, and is widely used in telecommunications.
In our setup, we used a polarization maintaining circulator from THORLABS (model
CIR1550PM) with insertion loss equal to 0:9 db and 40 db isolation.
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Figure 4.6: The two tritters used in the setup have 4 PM and 2 SM ports. Using
them as in the picture allows us to have a PM qutrits source and measuring station.
Three-ports ber couplers - Tritters
These couplers are a key component in our setup, as they materially create the
qutrits and are responsible for the interference. They are basically made of three
ber cores fused together along a short distance, thus coupling EM elds from/into
dierent ports. Due to energy conservation they introduce a e
i2
3 relative phase shift
between the outputs, as we have seen in sec. 1.2.3.
While those calculations referred to ideal tritters, i.e. with equal coupling eciencies
among the dierent ports and no insertion loss, real devices are slightly dierent,
mainly in the latter condition. In particular we have used two tritters, again from
THORLABS, with 4 PM ports and 2 SM ports each, as you can see in g. 4.6.
Measured coupling ratios for the two tritters and the used ports (referring to g.
4.6) are reported in each tritter data sheet. We list them in tab. 4.1.
Tritter Input ! Output Ratio
TRIT1
0! 3 33:39%
0! 4 41:46%
0! 5 25:15%
1! 3 42:64%
1! 4 23:33%
1! 5 34:03%
2! 3 25:65%
2! 4 34:52%
2! 5 39:83%
TRIT2
0! 1 36:54%
0! 2 27:34%
0! 3 36:12%
Table 4.1: Coupling ratios for the two employed tritters.
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Of course these small dierences in the ratios aect interference visibility and
error rates, as equal intensities would be required to have good interferometric re-
sults. Unfortunately, the only way to x this problem would be to have tritters with
equal coupling ratios between every input-output pair. On the other hand, uniform
insertion loss is not a problem in our case, since we need to attenuate the laser pulses
anyway.
Polarization Controller
Having the same polarization is a crucial requirement for dierent light pulses
to interfere. In our setup this is not a problem since every photon, on its way back
to Alice's tritter system, goes through Bob's PM, inside which there is a horizontal
polarizer that simply kills the vertical component, so that only horizontally polarized
light interferes in TRIT1 1
However for this reason, if photons arriving at these polarizers are vertically (or
close to vertically) polarized, they will be almost completely deleted by them, and
as the setup is already attenuating a lot by itself, we would like to avoid this. This
is why we put a polarization controller next to the long SMF, which is by far the
most polarization-changing object in our experiment.
The particular PC we adopted is from OZ Optics (model HFPC-11-1550-S-9/125-
SCSC), and it consists of a short ber length (0:39 ns) on which you can easily apply
stress from any angle along its longitudinal section. These PCs are specically built
to make elliptically polarized light, coming from a SMF, linearly polarized in order
to inject it into PMFs.
Mirror
We employed an extremely simple retroreector from THORLABS (model P1-
SMF28ER-P01-1) with one meter (5:07 ns) SMF tail. It has a minimum reectance
of 97:5%.
4.1.2 Active Optical Components
Laser Source
As we said before, the ideal case scenario in quantum communication would be
to use true single photon sources, which are still being researched. In the meantime,
the common solution is to use pulsed weak lasers attenuated well below the single
photon level.
1Actually, DLL and DLM are made of many bers, therefore several connectors can somehow
slightly alter the horizontal polarization, again aecting visibilities and error rates.
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In our work, we have employed a source which has actually been designed appositely
for this task: it is a 1550 nm laser diode (model ID300) made by ID Quantique (one
of the few rms that industrially produces QKD systems), externally triggered, that
generates 1 mW pulses with FWHM ' 500 ns, and can be triggered at up to 500
MHz. In our experiment we have used two dierent trigger frequencies: a slower
one, 3 kHz, for manual calibration of the interferometer (we will talk about its phase
drifting in a while), and a faster frequency, equal to 70 kHz, for the communication.
This limited frequency is due to the relatively slow FPGA card, which has long rise
times for digital outputs, approximately 200 ns.
Light coming out from the laser is horizontally polarized, that is, aligned to the slow
axis.
Attenuator
As we said before, a coherent light source as a laser can approximate a single
photon source if its emissions are strongly attenuated.
In that situation, the photon number distribution is Poissonian (see sec. 2.2.3), that
is the probability for a pulse with n photons averagely to contain n of them is
P (n) = e n

nn
n!

: (4.1)
In our case we chose to attenuate until we had n = 0:1 (which is the usual choice
in the eld) at the position in the setup where security against eavesdropping is
needed, that is after Charlie's PM in the way back, after reection and Charlie's
modulation. At this intensity level we have the following probabilities
Pn=0:1(0) = 0:905
Pn=0:1(1) = 0:090
Pn=0:1(n > 1) = 0:005 ;
(4.2)
i.e. approximately one every ten pulses contains a single photon and around 5% of
these have more than one. It is now very clear why this attenuated laser source is a
big limitation for secure communication systems.
In our case, we have employed a digital variable attenuator from OZ Optics (model
DA-100-SC-1550-9/125-P-50). It has  1:6 dB insertion loss, 2:11 ns insertion delay
and can attenuate an additional 0:00 dB to  60:00 dB in 0:01 dB steps with 0:03
dB accuracy.
Depending on small changes in the setup, we set attenuation values from ranging
from  18:00 to  22:00 dB. As the desired intensity level is clearly too low to be
measured with any power meter or oscilloscope, to set the right values we measured
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attenuations from dierent parts of the setup separately and we checked nal in-
tensities at the single photon detectors, considering that they have 20% detection
eciencies. However, since in this work we were not aiming for the best generation
rate possible, we considered the n = 0:1 level as an upper bound, so that experiments
were run even if we were slightly below this intensity.
Phase Modulators
In our case, modulating the phase of a photon roughly means changing its velocity
while keeping the same path lengths. This can be done by modifying the medium
refractive index, which is easily obtained in materials exhibiting the electro-optic
eect, as lithium niobate. This eect consists in the (linear in the lithium niobate
case) dependence of the refractive index on the strength of the local electric eld.
Therefore, if we put a parallel plates capacitor along the propagating direction, its
eld will be proportional to the potential we apply, thus the angular modulation is
proportional to the voltage. We can clearly see this dependence in the calibration
plot in g. 4.9.
The PM we used are made by JDSU (model APE PM-150-005) in lithium niobate,
and they all have the same calibration. They work with DC voltages at up to 500
MHz repetition rates, and have 3:5 dB insertion loss and PMFs of dierent lengths.
Since the phase modulation is polarization dependent, they all include a horizontal
polarizer (aligned to the PMF slow axis).
We should say at this point that Bob's and Charlie's stations actually include two
PMs each because of timing reasons. However, nothing changes by imagining every
pair as a single PM.
4.1.3 Electronic Devices
FPGA Card
Communication between the controlling software and the experimental hardware
is carried out by a Field Programmable Gate Array board. This is an integrated
circuit that can be programmed after manufacturing via computer. Our card is the
PCI-7833R, sold by National Instruments and whose FPGA circuit is manufactured
by Xilinx. It has 8 analog inputs, 8 analog outputs and 96 digital input/outputs,
and an internal clock working at 40 MHz and multiples, depending on the gate
programming required.
We used an 80 MHz clock, which means that the best time resolution our software
can have is 1
80
= 12:5 ns. This, together with the fact that the analog outputs are
relatively slow (around 1 s rise time) and have low currents, is the reason why we
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used standard pulse generators to trigger laser and detectors and to drive the PMs
(that have high input impedance).
Quantum Composers delay pulse generator
The 9528 Digital Delay Pulse Generator manufactured by Quantum Composers
is an 8 channels voltage generator that can provide standard digital and variable
analog voltages with a time resolution of 250 ps and 200 ps jitter. In can be externally
triggered and can operate at up to 20 MHz.
We triggered the 9528 with the FPGA card and we employed four channels to
(digitally) trigger laser and detectors, and two channels to drive Alice's PMs with
analog voltages.
While this pulse generator has plenty of options, its major drawback is the rise time
of the analog output signals, which is around 100 ns. Since qutrits created by Alice
are made of three 63:4 ns apart pulses, this pulse generator is clearly not an option
for the sequential modulation that Bob and Charlie are doing. Besides, the 9528 is
two channels short of what we need for these users. These are the reasons why we
used two additional pulse generators.
P400 delay pulse generator
The Highland Technology P400 delay and pulse generator is an extremely precise
4-channels device that can produce digital and analog voltages at 10 MHz with a
jitter of only 25 ns. Widths and delays are adjustable for every output with 1
ps resolution and voltages can be set from  5:0 to 11:8 V. The most astonishing
feature is the analog output rising time, which is equal to 2 ns from 0 to 11:8 V, thus
making it the ideal candidate for sequentially modulating qutrit pulses at Bob's and
Charlie's stations.
For timing reasons, we employed two P400s, one to perform ! phase shifts and the
other for !2. They were both triggered by the FPGA card.
Single Photon Detectors
The technologically most advanced devices employed in this experiment are the
three PGA-600 single photon detectors manufactured by Princeton Lightwave. Since
silicon photodetectors are insensitive in this wavelength region, the PGA-600 include
an InGaAs diode. But this alone is not enough to detect 1550 nm single photons: the
diodes are also biased above their breakdown voltages for a very short period - 1 ns -
every time the detector is triggered and a photon is expected. This technique allows
the device to reach 20% detection eciency, but also causes so called dark counts,
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which are fake detections due to avalanches started by the diode carriers. By cooling
down the detectors to 218 K dark counts are extremely reduced (below 5  10 5 per
trigger), but considering the fact that we have one photon leaving Charlie's station
every ten triggers and all the following attenuation, even a low number of dark
counts can considerably aect the nal error rate, as we will quantitatively see in
the following section.
Our three photodetectors are externally triggered by the Quantum Composer and
every time a detection happens, they send a TTL pulse to the FPGA card that
stores it for the analysis.
4.1.4 LabVIEW Software
In order to easily and automatically control most of the parameters in the ex-
periment, We have written some software in LabVIEW code. This programming
language makes communication between computer and instruments way easier that
other more generic coding languages, since many devices drivers can be downloaded
from the web and used more or less right away. However, the price for this simplicity
is exibility, as usual: the available functions and methods that can be implemented
are predetermined and not innite, and a software often needs some serious upgrad-
ing every time the setup - or the analysis - is changed. Besides, as code optimization
is automatically carried out by the compiler, it can sometimes be far from perfect.
Still, a good LabVIEW software can easily take care of everything, from the (pseudo)
random numbers generation to the QTER calculation. To give an idea of how this
language really is easy to use, suce it to know that the whole software controlling
the experiment has been written in something more than a month, starting from no
knowledge of the code whatsoever.
Since timing requirements are way too strict for a common operating system (Win-
down and Unix have approximately 1 ms time resolutions), the input and output
settings cannot be controlled by the workstation in real time. This is why the soft-
ware is divided in two main programs that we may call host-software (HS) and
FPGA-software (FS). The main dierence as you may guess is that the HS runs in
the computer, while the FS is run by the FPGA card. Slightly less roughly, they
work in the following way:
1. After the user has set the desired parameters in the graphical interface of the
HS, this part sends them to the FS through a FIFO (First-In-First-Out) mem-
ory buer. Due to this buer limited resources, the settings for a maximum of
70000 runs (i.e. 70000 laser and detectors triggers) can be stored each time.
2. The FS runs the experiment and gets from the FPGA card inputs the signals
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from the detectors, storing them in an internal register.
3. After the 70000 runs are nished, the FS returns to the HS the raw data,
which can now be securely stored in the computer memory.
Steps 1  3 are called a loop.
4. New loops are carried out as many times as the user has initially set.
Once all of them have been executed, the HS performs the analysis required
to calculate the QTER, plus some other signicant results.
In g. 4.7 we can have a look at the HS graphical interface.
Figure 4.7: Graphical interface of the controlling software.
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4.2 Three Users QSS with Qutrits - The Protocol
Knowing something more about the setup, we can now specify the protocol
presented in sec. 3.2.2 for this experimental conguration.
For stability reasons, we have used three dimensional systems (qutrits), i.e. the
lowest possible dimensionality the qudits protocol allows. Moreover, we realized our
proof-of-principle for three parties, just enough to have secret sharing.
First of all, let's analyze how our choices change the general formalism.
 Three dimensional systems - qutrits
 Using qutrits implies adopting MUBs for three dimensions, for example
matrices M2, M3 and M4 in eq. (2.47), since M1 cannot be used for
interferometric setups.
 From eqs. (3.8) and (3.10) we nd for three dimensions
X^3 =
2X
m=0
!mjmihmj = j0ih0j+ !j1ih1j+ !2j2ih2j (4.3)
for the vector changing operator, and
Y^3 =
2X
m=0
!m
2 jmihmj = j0ih0j+ !j1ih1j+ !4j2ih2j (4.4)
for the basis changing operator.
 In the key-sifting part (step 5 in the qudits protocol in sec. 3.2.2), the
condition for a valid run in eq. (3.15) becomes
NX
n=1
yn = 0 mod 3 : (4.5)
 yn = f0;1g 8n = f1; :::; Ng . This of course reduces the number of possible
(x; y) pairs every party can apply, from nine to six. From a more practical
point of view, the main consequence is a smaller fraction of valid runs, from 1
3
to 1
4
, since there are less possibilities to satisfy condition (4.5), thus resulting
in a slightly lower generation rate.
You may be wondering what the reason for this apparently pointless limitation
is! Everything will be clearer as soon as we will have explained what applying
(x; y)  practically means, but for now suce it to know that more (x; y) pairs
possibilities means more (classical!) computational resources needed by the
controlling software, and this increase is exponential in the number of pairs.
This experiment being a proof of concept, we are more interested in the physics,
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that is showing the validity of the protocol which in principle is not changed
by this limitation, than having high generation rates, rather a technological
issue.
 Three parties: considering the previous choice, the consequence of having
three users is that the condition for a run to be valid becomes
NX
n=1
yn 2 f0; 3g (4.6)
that is, either all parties have y = 0 or they all have y = 1.
We can now present step-by-step the scheme we used in our experiment, in a more
explicit and experimental way than in sec. 3.2.2.
The exposition will refer to our setup, shown in g. 4.1.
1. Alice, who plays the role of the distributor, prepares a qutrit in the initial
state
j 0i = 1p
3
(j0i+ j1i+ j2i) (4.7)
2. Charlie, Bob and Alice generate each the two independent random numbers
xi 2 f0; 1; 2g and yi 2 f0; 1g where i = C,B,A stands for the user's name
initial. Then, sequentially and in C ! B ! A order, they act with the
operator X^xi3 Y^
yi
3 . To understand better how these operators action practically
works, we can start by writing down explicitly all the possible combinations
for each party, since there are only six of them:
(x; y) = (0; 0) = X^03 Y^
0
3 = 1313 = j0ih0j+ j1ih1j+ j2ih2j
(1; 0) = X^13 Y^
0
3 = j0ih0j+ !j1ih1j+ !2j2ih2j
(2; 0) = X^23 Y^
0
3 = j0ih0j+ !2j1ih1j+ !j2ih2j
(0; 1) = X^03 Y^
1
3 = j0ih0j+ !j1ih1j+ !j2ih2j
(1; 1) = X^13 Y^
1
3 = !j0ih0j+ j1ih1j+ !j2ih2j
(2; 1) = X^23 Y^
1
3 = !j0ih0j+ !j1ih1j+ j2ih2j
(4.8)
with ! = e
i2
3 . Since the three computational states (j0i; j1i; j2i) are separated
in time (see the next section for more details), every user can actually perform
the phase shifts on every one of them separately and sequentially. For example,
suppose Charlie generated the pair (1; 0); he will
(a) do nothing to the rst (j0i) pulse
(b) apply an ! = e
i2
3 phase shift to the second (j1i)
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(c) apply an !2 = e
i4
3 phase shift to the third (j2i).
How to phase shift these light pulses? What you need to do is either change
the path length or change the refractive index of the medium. Of course the
best (and the only practically feasible in bers) way to do it is the latter,
and we achieved it with commercial phase modulators, as we described in sec.
4.1.2.
3. After all three parties have applied their own transformations, Alice obtains
the nal state
j fi = 1p
3
2X
k=0
!
P
i=C;B;A(kxi+k2yi)jki (4.9)
on which she performs a measurement in basis M2, that is explicitly
M2 =
8><>:
1p
3
(j0i+ j1i+ j2i) ;
1p
3
(j0i+ !j1i+ !2j2i) ;
1p
3
(j0i+ !2j1i+ !j2i)
9>=>; ; (4.10)
with the tritter on the left in g. 4.1 (TRIT1)2, getting the outcome a 2
f0; 1; 2g .
4. Now Alice should announce the outcome publicly, then the three parties would
randomly disclose some of their yi and the non-valid runs would be discarded.
But since this experiment is a proof of principle, we physicists working in the
lab need to know everything in advance, in order to prove the principle indeed!
So, at this point there are two possibilities:
(a) Condition X
i=C;B;A
yi 2 f0; 3g (4.11)
is satised and the run is valid. Then if the measurement result is actually
the same as predicted by equationX
i=C;B;A
xi = a mod 3 ; (4.12)
we label the run as correct, otherwise as wrong.
(b) Equation (4.11) is not satised. The outcome is then random, and we
label it that way.
2For a precise description of how a tritter works, see sec. 1.2.3 and [13]
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5. We rerun the experiment many times from step 1 to step 4 with the same
(xi;yi) settings for every party. If case (a) in the previous step was true, then
we should have only valid runs, and we can proceed on calculating the qutrit
error rate as
QTER =
[wrong runs]
[valid runs]
=
[wrong runs]
[correct runs] + [wrong runs]
: (4.13)
Otherwise, if case (b) was true, we have only random runs, and we can just
check if probabilities are actually uniformly 1
3
for every detector by comparing
outcome counts.
6. Whenever we set transformations that produce valid runs, if the obtained
QTER is below 15:95% (see [4]), it means that the experiment was successful,
i.e. we could detect any eavesdropping while doing secret sharing
with this setup and protocol.
After a brief discussion of the most important devices used throughout the experi-
ment, we will proceed with results presentation and some comments.
4.3 Results and Analysis
4.3.1 Phase Modulators Calibration
The rst measurements we performed was the PMs calibration. To take these
measurements we employed a very simple Plug&Play setup, as in g. 4.8. This
setup, completely polarization maintaining, is extremely stable (as we have said in
sec. 3.1.3), thus making for an ideal calibration benchmark.
The measurements conrmed our expectation that all our PMs are identical. For
this reason, we will report only one calibration. The results, taken using a LeCroy
WaveMaster 8300A oscilloscope, are plotted in g. 4.9.
Figure 4.8: Plug&Play setup used for PMs calibration.
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Figure 4.9: Amplitude vs. modulation voltage plot for one of the PMs. The angular
phase shift is clearly linear in the voltage. Sinusoidal tting curves are also plotted.
From the sinusoidal tting, we obtained the period of the phase shifting in volts,
which is equal to (13:97 0:07) V. Therefore, the voltages needed to perform the !
and !2 phase shifts are
'! =
2
3
! V! =(4:66 0:02) V
'!2 =
4
3
! V!2 =(9:31 0:05) V :
(4.14)
It is worth pointing out that these voltages uncertainties produce angular errors,
in the phase shifts, that are fractions of a degree. These quantities are absolutely
negligible compared to the errors introduced by all the factors we are going to
describe in a moment, thus they will simply be neglected.
4.3.2 Qutrit Error Rates
There are (3  2)3 = 216 possible (xi; yi) pairs combinations for three parties. We
report in tab. 4.2 some results which, as you will see, are quite similar among each
other. In the table, a is the expected measurement outcome, Ci=0;1;2 are counts in
detector i, QTER are calculated with the formula in eq. (4.13), and generation rates
(R) are simply ratios between total counts and total running time.
Every measurement consisted in 10 loops with 70000 runs each, and lasted 30
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(xA; yA) (xB; yB) (xC; yC) a C0 C1 C2 QTER R[trits=s]
(0; 0) (0; 0) (1; 0) 1 15 243 15 10:99% 9:1
(0; 0) (0; 0) (2; 0) 2 14 15 246 10:58% 9:2
(0; 0) (1; 0) (0; 0) 1 10 182 10 9:90% 6:7
(0; 0) (1; 0) (1; 0) 2 7 14 190 9:95% 7:0
(0; 0) (1; 0) (2; 0) 0 232 19 5 9:37% 8:5
(0; 0) (2; 0) (0; 0) 2 9 16 233 9:69% 8:6
(0; 0) (2; 0) (1; 0) 0 292 13 23 10:98% 10:9
(0; 0) (2; 0) (2; 0) 1 14 228 12 10:24% 8:5
(0; 1) (0; 1) (0; 1) 0 228 3 23 10:24% 8:5
(0; 1) (0; 1) (1; 1) 2 15 11 231 10:12% 8:6
(0; 1) (0; 1) (2; 1) 1 14 270 19 10:89% 10:1
(0; 1) (1; 1) (0; 1) 2 14 13 239 10:15% 8:9
(0; 1) (1; 1) (1; 1) 1 8 204 16 10:53% 7:6
(0; 1) (1; 1) (2; 1) 0 225 20 6 10:36% 8:4
(0; 1) (2; 1) (0; 1) 1 15 239 13 10:49% 8:9
(0; 1) (2; 1) (1; 1) 0 220 7 19 10:57% 8:2
(0; 1) (0; 0) (1; 1) random 54 57 40    
(0; 1) (0; 0) (0; 1) random 40 49 67    
(0; 1) (1; 1) (1; 0) random 44 45 66    
(0; 0) (1; 1) (0; 1) random 61 61 72    
Table 4.2: Some measurement results. QTER is not dened if the expected measure-
ment outcome is random, and the generation rate is clearly zero in that case, since in
a real secret sharing application all these runs would be discarded.
seconds3 (see sec. 4.1.4).
From the measurements reported here it is clear that not only that the protocol
presented in sec. 4.2 works, but also that real secret sharing tasks with this
setup are possible, since no measured QTER reaches the 15:95% security threshold
[4], and actually they all are below 11%. These results are similar to those in
entanglement-based qutrits experiments [5]. In the next paragraphs we will comment
the data and try to understand what the reasons could be for our QTER to deviate
from the ideal 0%.
3We have said before that the laser trigger frequency was 70 kHz. This stands correct, but due
to computer elaboration time, there is a small time gap (of around two seconds) between loops,
thus lowering the average frequency of a measurement.
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Phase Drift
The main experimental problem any interferometer presents is a never stopping
phase drift. This causes the interference pattern to move without any apparent ex-
ternal cause.
However, we need to consider that the light wavelength is - in our case - 1550 nm,
and few nanometers changes in the paths length dierences can be noticed with bare
eyes in the interference pattern.
The main reasons for these small length changes are temperature uctuations and
mechanical stresses (as vibrations). Necessary countermeasures, adopted through-
out the whole experiment, consist in putting the whole tritter system inside an
aluminum bow thermally shielded with Styrofoam, and placing this box on a stable
optical table. These expedients allowed, some 20 minutes after the box closure, to
have a more stable system.
During measuring sessions, it took the system around 10 minutes to make a full 2
phase shift due to this drift. Now, to evaluate the consequences of this systematic
error on the QTER, we can think of it as a change in the relative phase (i.e. angle)
between the three arms. Considering that every measurement lasted 30 seconds, 10
minutes for a 2 phase shift correspond to an 18 change during one measurement.
If we put this value in eqs. (2.40) and calculate the probabilities, we get a QTER
of approximately 2:2%.
While a bit roughly, this clearly labels this natural phase drift as the main sys-
tematic contribution to our error, thus making it the most eminent problem to solve
in the future. Actually, good solutions have already been found and partially im-
plemented [36], but need to be upgraded and optimized for every particular case.
They basically consist in a PID (proportional-integral-derivative) controller that
automatically adjusts the voltage in PMs to keep the system stable. Precisely this
adjustment leads us to the next problem.
Calibration
Because of the above-mentioned phase drift intrinsic to the system, there was a
necessary procedure to do before every measurement that can be called calibration.
This consists in changing the phases until, without any additional transformation,
we had a maximum of interference in detector 0 and minima in the other two.
We set this situation as our no modulation starting point, and run the protocol
once thereafter. Since both phases and voltages are relative, nothing changes in
the formalism, and measurements of course conrmed this. However, due to the
drift, this calibration process cannot take too long, thus it is not perfect. To make
it faster, we reduced the attenuation in order to see higher count dierences, since
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probabilities don't change between classical and quantum regime anyway (compare
eqs. (1.14) and (2.40)). Still, due to intensity uctuations the maxima and minima
could be found with a limited precision, also because the intensity curve derivative
is zero at these points. To quantitatively evaluate this calibration error, we can
consider the fact that during this process, we could not distinguish a maximum (or
minimum) up to a voltage variation of 0:5V , that correspond to ' 13. This is
another a systematic error that aects our interferometric visibility. To quantify it
we can, as before, calculate the QTER given by the probabilities in eqs. (2.40) with
this angular shift. We get a contribution to our QTER equal to 1:1%.
Therefore, this is an other relevant issue in the experiment. It can be partially
solved by using a PID circuit as we mentioned in the previous paragraph, but the
underlaying cause, which is those intensity uctuations, is intrinsic to any ber
system and is probably due to mechanical stresses and temperature uctuations that
slightly change the single mode ber birefringence, thus changing the polarization
arriving at the polarizers inside the PMs. These uctuations are also the reason
behind the slightly dierent generation rates in tab. 4.2.
Dark Counts
In sec. 4.1.3, when we described single photon detectors, we mentioned that they
suer from so-called dark counts, that are basically counts without photons, due to
the above breakdown threshold bias. These counts represent a systematic error, and
are independent of any laser. We measured their probability by running 50 loops (i.e
50 70000 = 3:5 106 runs) with the laser o, and we obtained 1 count per loop, that
is approximately 1:4  10 5 dark counts per trigger. This is in agreement with what
is written in the data sheets of our detectors (whose values range from 1:3  10 5 to
1:8  10 5).
Considering again a typical case of 200 10 10 counts and QTER= 9%, subtracting
dark counts would give us 199  9  9 counts and QTER= 8:29%, that is 0:7% less.
In conclusion, this is an important issue too. However, this problem cannot be
solved without using dierent types of single photon detectors, which are still not
commercially available. Nonetheless, we should consider that dark counts are con-
stant and independent of the working frequency, thus setting it higher, or simply
reducing the setup attenuation rate, would lower their weight in the nal result.
Interfering Polarizations and Intensities
Finally, two problems regarding the tritter may aect our interference quality.
In order to have perfect patterns, interfering light pulses must have the same po-
larization and same intensities. With regards to polarization, we should point out
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that there are many ber connectors in both the medium and long arms. These
connectors, as we said before, may easily have small misalignments from the PMF
axis, thus leading to small polarization changes due to birefringence. This problem
can be solved by substituting all these sequential bers with a single one of the
needed length.
On the other hand, intensities dierences are caused by the slightly unequal coupling
ratios between tritters inputs and outputs (see tab. 4.1). To solve this, we would
need to use perfectly balanced tritters, which are hardly possible to nd.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Achievements
In this work, we have carried out a proof-of-principle experiment that has shown
the possibility to achieve secret sharing tasks with qutrits and a single photon, with
phase encoding, for the rst time to our knowledge.
Our optical interferometric setup is entirely based on bers, in order to make that
possibility more realistically implementable with current ber telecommunication
networks.
In addition, this thesis work included extensive LabVIEW programming. The writ-
ten software not only run the experiment while setting many protocol parameters,
but also carried out most of the data analysis, as errors and rates calculation.
We have obtained secret sharing with error rates below 11%, that is quite far
from the maximum security bound of 15:95%, and comparable to results found in
literature [5]. This denitively proves that our setup can be employed for secure
secret sharing tasks.
Above all, however, our protocol has some crucial advantages over other realiza-
tions based on entanglement. For example, with our setup we can easily extend our
conguration to as many parties as we want, at the only price of signal attenua-
tion, while in the entangled version more users means entangled states with more
particles, whose generation is still an experimentally researched issue. On the other
hand, the single particle scheme shows a denitive superiority in detection eciency.
In fact, as we mentioned before, entanglement-based protocols need three detectors
per user (at least with three dimensional systems), and for a run to be considered
valid every one of them needs to detect a photon with one of his three detectors
(that is, perform a measurement and get any outcome). Supposing now that these
detectors have an eciency equal to  (where   20% in the best case scenario),
then this probability scales as N , where N is the number of parties.
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In our single particle scheme instead, only one user (Alice in our experiment) per-
forms the measurements, thus the abovementioned probability is always proportional
to , independently of the number of parties. This makes our protocol extremely
more scalable compared to the other proposals.
Finally, beside secret sharing, other security problems can be experimentally ad-
dressed with this same setup, for example the Byzantine Agreement and the Com-
munication Complexity protocols. Therefore, many good results can be achieved
with this conguration.
5.2 Future Improvements of the Setup
The fact that this experiment turned out to be successful represents a new place
where to start from in order to achieve real secure QSS. Indeed, at the time of this
writing, an upgraded version of the setup with a long delay between Alice and Bob
is being realized and characterized.
However, to fulll our dream of unconditionally secure secrets in everyday life,
some improvements are still needed, as we have seen in chapter 4.
First of all, many kilometers of bers would separate each user from the others,
thus a far better phase stability control is needed. PID softwares could be a good
solution to this problem.
Another great limitation that this experiment shared with every other in the quan-
tum communication eld is the photon source. In fact, our results indicate secure
communication only if we suppose to have had exclusively single photons modulated
in every run. To avert this security breach, we lowered the intensity to very low val-
ues, much below the single level. This of course highly limit the generation rate,
thus giving more weight to the dark counts problem.
Talking about generation rates leads us to the discussion of a main part of our
work, that is LabVIEW coding. While it proved to be very simple, powerful and
reliable, this programming environment has also imposed some serious constraints
on the experiment. For example, its low time resolution has made us use the P400
pulse generators to drive Bob's and Charlie's phase modulators, while Alice's ones
had to be controlled by the much slower 9528 Quantum Composer pulse generator,
thus lowering the maximum working frequency. Apart from code optimization, an
integrated circuit specically realized for the experiment, or at least less generic
than an FPGA card, would probably result in much higher performances.
Another constraint to the generation rate which is shared among all quantum
communication protocols is the detecting eciency. InGaAs avalanche diodes are
the best commercially available single photon detectors in the 1550 nm wavelength
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region, nevertheless they have a very big drawback in the relatively low 20% e-
ciency. Groups all around the world have been studying and realizing prototypes
of a new type of superconducting single photon detectors, that can reach outstand-
ingly high eciencies for these wavelengths, even more than 90%, while working at
above-GHz frequencies [37].
Last but not least, it should be reminded that secret sharing and QKD protocols
at some point all require, in general, random numbers generation, and that this needs
to be genuinely random to make the communication secure. In our experiment we
generated these numbers with pseudo random codes in the computer, while a real
QSS implementation would need for example a quantum random number generator.
Hopefully, in a near future, this work will help in making secure quantum commu-
nication the standard way to exchange sensitive information, thus taking the amaz-
ing world of quantum mechanics one step closer to non-specialists curious enough
to learn it.
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